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Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine
KEVJN McMuNIGAL*

Dissatisfaction with the subject of attorney conflict of interest appears to
be widespread. A leading scholar reports that much of attorney conflict of
interest doctrine is "arcane, a subspecialty whose interpretation can seem
as abstruse as explicating the Dead Sea Scrolls. "1 A recent treatise in
troduces the subject with the assessment that attorney conflict of interest
problems "are not only pervasive, but intractable. "2 Such sentiments are
not uncommon. Indeed, the regularity and frequency with which words
such as "arcane, " "abstruse, " "intractable, " "difficult, "3 "troublesome, "4
"confusion "5 and "morass " 6 occur in reference to attorney conflict of inter
est suggest widely felt frustration with current treatment of the subject. 7
The subject of attorney conflict of interest in recent years has "dramati
cally increased in importance and in the frequency with which it is liti
gated. "8 It has been described as presenting "the most litigated questions
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve U niversity; B.A. 1 973, Stanford University;
J.D. 1 979, University of California, Berkeley. I thank Rebecca Dresser, William Hodes, Peter Joy,
Gerald Korngold, Robert Lawry, William Marshall, Deborah Rhode and participants in a faculty
workshop at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I also thank
W illiam Edwards and Denise K ipfstuhl for their research assistance and Heidi Emick for her invalua
ble secretarial support.
I . Stephen G i llers, Conflicts: Risky New Rules, AM. LAW., Sept. 1 989, at 3 9.
2. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD. JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT§ 1 .7:1 0 1 , at 2 1 7 (2d ed. Supp. 1 99 1 ) ("Some of the
most difficult problems in the law of lawyering are problems of conflict of interest. These problems are
not only pervasive, but intractable; many of them can at best be ameliorated - not 'solved.' ").
3 . See id.
4. See l. R AY PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY§ 4.0 1 , at 4( 1 982) ("The lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest in the representation of a client is one of the
most troublesome for the profession.").
5. See N ancy J. Moore, C01if/icts of Interest in the Simultaneous Represemation of Multiple Cli
e/1/s: A Proposed Solution t o the Current Confusion and Controversy, 6 1 TE X . L. REv. 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 ( 1 982)
("One of the most fertile sources of confusion has been the rules dealing with multiple representation of
clients with conflicting interests:").
6. See Robert P. Lawry, ThJ Meaning of Loyalty, 1 9 CAP. U. L. REv. 1 089, 1 090 ( 1 990) ( referring
to "the present morass of the rules surrounding conflict of interest issues").
7. For other expressions of dissatisfaction with current conflict of interest doctrine, see, e.g.,
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 1 94 ( 1 990) (describing the Model Code
and Model Rules conflict of interest provisions as using "confusing language and multiple standards of
what constitutes a conflict of interest"); M ARC I. STEINBERG & TIMOTHY U. SHARPE, Attorney Con
flicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NoTRE DAME L. R Ev I, 2 ( 1 990) ("[T)he
rules of professional ethics and decisions in [the conflict of interest) area are far from acceptable.'').
8 . Charles W . Wolfram, The Concept of a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, I G Eo. J.
LEGAL ETHIC'S 1 95 , 207 ( 1 987).
.
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of professional responsibility"9 and as a subject which has grown "enor
mously, geometrically, exponentially. " 1 0 Lawyers encounter conflict of in
terest problems in every area of practice1 1 and face the possibility of profes
sional discipline, 1 2 disqualification, 1 3 civil damages1 4 or loss or reduction of
fees1 5 if they violate conflict of interest rules. The monetary consequences
of violating conflict of interest rules have been dramatically illustrated by
multi-million dollar judgments and settlements. 1 6 G iven the pervasiveness
and potential consequences of conflict of interest questions, one would ex
pect the "arcane " and "intractable " nature of conflict of interest issues to
cause concern among lawyers today. In fact, leading ethics consultants re
port conflict of interest as the subject about which lawyers most frequently
9. Andrew L. Kaufman, Introduction: A Professional Agenda, 6 H oFSTRA L. REv. 6 I 9, 625 ( 1 978).
1 0. See Chris Goodrich, Ethics Business, CA L LAw., July 1 99 1 , at 36, 37 (quoting J udge Simon H.
Rifkind as stating that " [w]ith the growth of the size of law firms, the problem of conflict [of interest)
has grown enormously, geometrically, exponentially. The possibility that lawyers will cross wires is
almost inevitable.").
I I. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7 . 1 . 1 , at 3 1 3 ( 1 986) ("Conflict of interest
problems are probably the most pervasively felt of all the problems of professional responsibility that
might haunt lawyers.").
1 2. See, e.g., In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655 (Or. 1 979) (upholding reprimand for a lawyer charged
with conflict of interest arising out of transaction involving small, closely held corporation, its stock
holders and a third party); In re Dolan, 384 A.2d 1 076 (N.J. I 978) (reprimanding an attorney for
concurrently representing buyer and seller in purchase of low and moderate income housing units).
I 3 . See,· e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco I nc., 646 F.2d I 339 (9th Cir. 1 98 1 ) (upholding
denial of motion to disqualify law firm for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility);
Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (I st Cir. 1 987) (finding failure to disqualify counsel because of
conflict of interest to be abuse of discretion).
1 4. See, e.g., Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1 966) (acknowledging
conflict of interest as possible basis for malpractice action and reversing grant of summary judgment
because of existence of disputed issues of fact); W.R. Habeeb, Annotation, Malpractice: Liability of
Attomey Representing Conflicting Interests, 28 A.L.R. 3d 389, 39 1 -9 2 ( 1 969). For a discussion of the
applicability of the ethics provisions on conflict of interest in a civil suit for damages, sec Charles C.
Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure of A ttorney Liability in Civil Litiga
tion, 30 SC L REv. 28 1 , 304-07 ( 1 979).
1 5 . Financial General Bankshares, I nc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 762-63 (D.D.C. 1 98 1 ) (refer
ring to the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility to determine whether breach
of common law duty of fiduciary and ethical obligations has occurred), vacated for lack ofjurisdiction,
680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1 982).
1 6. Kirk Victor, Venable Agrees to $27M Accord, NAT'L L.J, May 25, 1 987, at 3 (reporting $27
million settlement by the Baltimore firm of Venable, Baetjer and Howard of case alleging conflict of
interest violations in simultaneously representing the Maryland Savings-Share Insurance Corporation
( MSSIC) and Old Court Savings and Loan, a financial institution regulated by the MSSI C.) The
article reports the settlement as "believed to be the country's second largest malpractice settlement."
/d.; Stephen J . Adler, Texas Law Firm Agrees to Pay Widow $4.3 Million After Suit for Malpractice,
WALL ST . .1, May 1 7, 1 988, at 6 (reporting ( I) $24.4 million jury verdict, reduced by trial judge to
$ 1 6.7 million, against a law firm based in part on allegations of conflict of interest relating to the firm's
drafting of a will that permitted one of the firm's lawyers to act as executor and the executor to hire his
own firm to perform the estate's legal work and (2) that the case was settled on appeal for $4.3
million) .
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seek their advice. 1 7
This article focuses on conflict of interest doctrine dealing with concur
rent conflict of interest issues.1 8 Its thesis is that a primary source of confu
sion in conflict of interest doctrine is its failure to clearly articulate and
answer the central questions which lie at the heart of the subject. In es
sence it argues that to remedy this confusion we need to rethink attorney
conflict of interest doctrine so that it focuses more clearly on articulating
and answering these central questions.
Part I briefly examines the types of questions we normally label "conflict
of interest" and concludes that the common element which brings such
questions within this doctrinal niche is concern with the existence of incen
tives which threaten to impair the effective and ethical functioning of a
lawyer. It concludes that the primary task of conflict of interest doctrine is
to formulate an appropriate response to situations which threaten impair
ment of an attorney's functioning.
Part II examines possible responses to situations which pose such threats.
It concludes that a fundamental ambiguity in conflicts doctrine is its uncer
tainty about what approach to adopt in formulating this response. It con
cludes that three different approaches compete for expression in current
conflicts doctrine. A risk avoidance approach conveys the message that the
boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct is determined by
the degree of risk presented. A resulting impairment approach conveys the
message that the boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct
is the point at which the attorney's functioning is either actually impaired
or certain to be impaired. An appearance approach conveys the message
that the boundary between permissible and impermissible conduct is deter
mined by reference to the appearance of some impropriety. The conceptual
dissonance created as each of these approaches competes for expression is a
primary source of confusion in attorney conflict of interest doctrine. Part II
argues that in order to bring structure and clarity to the amorphous area of
conflict of interest we must clearly articulate and distinguish these compet
ing approaches.
"'

17. Goodrich, supra note 1 0, at 37 (reporting that Monroe Freedman, Stephen G iBers and Geoffrey
Hazard agree that in their role as ethics consultants "lawyers most often ask them about contlicts of
interest, especially whether a lawyer or firm can be disqualified from an ongoing case"); cf Richard A.
Zitrin, Allorney. Heal Thyself, C AL. LAW., July I 991, at 38 ("Some ethics experts engage in . . . casc
spccil1c and interactive consultation, particularly in emergency situations. Conflict of interest crises are
the most frequent . . . . )
1 8 . This Article does not directly address conflict of interest doctrine dealing with successive conllict
of interest issues. For economy of expression, the phrase "conllict of interest doctrine" is used in this
Article to refer to conllict of interest doctrine dealing with concurrent conflicts. On the distinction
between concurrent and successive conflict of interest, see STEPHEN G!Lt.ERS & No R MAN DoRSEN,
RECil:!.ATIO!'J OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS, Chapters XI- XII (2d ed. 1989).
"

.
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Part III examines in detail the risk avoidance approach. It concludes
that another primary source of confusion in conflicts doctrine is the failure
of the risk avoidance approach to fully develop the analytical components
required for risk analysis. Part III lays out the essential risk analysis ques
tions which must be asked and answered in order to resolve conflict of in
terest problems from the risk avoidance perspective. Its premise is that the
basic task of the risk avoidance approach is one of judgment about risk of
lawyer impairment. In exercising this judgment, one needs to analyze the
risk presented by asking a series of fundamental questions: What facets of
the lawyer's function should conflict of interest doctrine protect? What
risks to those facets should it define as acceptable? Should it tolerate any
risk? If so, how m uch risk is acceptable? Should conflict of interest doc•
trine tolerate greater risk if there are good reasons for taking the risk? In
other words, should the acceptability of the risk be a function of both the
magnitude and the justifiability of the risk? If so, what factors should con
flict of interest doctrine take into account in assessing the justifiability of
the risk? Finally, who should decide what risks are acceptable? Should we
defer to client preferences regarding trade-offs between magnitude and jus
tifiability of risk? Or should we override client preference in order to pro
tect or advance the interests of the client, the interests of lawyers or third
parties or broader societal interests? Who should be charged with this au
thority to override? The lawyer? The trial judge in a litigated case? Part
III argues that current doctrine does a poor job of articulating and answer
ing these questions.
How the questions raised in Parts II and III should finally be answered
is beyond the scope of this article. Although clearly articulating the central
questions which lie at the heart of conflict of interest should remove a good
deal of the confusion in attorney conflict of interest doctrine, it is only a
beginning. Part IV discusses difficulties which remain once we have accom
plished this task.
I. T H E

C O M M O N ELEMENT IN C O N FLICT OF INTER EST:
THR EAT OF l MP A I R M EI\'T

A.

TH E CONTEXTU A L I N CLI NATION

One encounters a powerful impulse in the field of attorney conflict of
interest to compartmentalize the subject into categories keyed to specific
factual contexts. 1 9 Such a contextual inclination is seen in parts of the
1 9. Similar tendencies are found in many areas of law. Oliver Wendell Holmes illustrated a ten
dency akin to the contextualist inclination with the story of "a Vermont justice of the peace before
whom a suit was brought by one farmer against another for breaking a churn. The justice took time to
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Model Code and Model Rules which utilize a number of conflict of inter
est rules applicable only to certain narrowly prescribed factual situations,
such as lawyer media rights transactions,2° lawyers appearing as witnesses21
or lawyer-client business dealsY Courts and ethics committees have cre
ated other context-specific rules not found in the Model Code or Model
Rules, such as the rule found in some jurisdictions against joint representa
tion of both buyer and seller during negotiation of a real estate agreement
of sale. 23 Professional Responsibility texts and treatises, as well as articles
dealing with conflict of interest, frequently organize treatment of conflict of
interest by headings keyed to factual context.24 And articles focusing exclu
sively on conflict of interest questions limited to narrow factual settings,
such as joint representation of criminal defendants, are a common feature
of the academic literature on attorney conflict of interest.25 At times, a
consider, and then said that he had looked through the statutes and could find nothing about churns,
and gave judgment for the defendant." O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1 0 H ARV. L. REv. 457,
474-75 ( 1 897). Holmes commented on the pervasiveness of this "state of mind," found in legal digests
and textbooks, which analyzes and catalogues cases according to individual factual idiosyncrasies rather
than legal principles which transcend the factual context of a particular case. This approach results in
cases being "tucked away under the head of Railroads or Telegraphs" rather than under the governing
legal rules. !d. at 475 . Holmes urged a more universalist approach, looking beyond the factual idiosyn
crasies of particular cases to discern the rule which provides the basis for prophesying the resolution of
future cases. !d.
20. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule J.8(d) ( 1 99 1 ) (hereinafter MODEL RULES];
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D R 5- 1 04(B) ( 1 983) [hereinafter MODEL CODE ] .
2 1 . MoDEL RuLES Rule 3 .7 ; M O D E L C o D E D R 5- 1 02.
22. MODEL RULES Rule 1 .8{a); MODEL CODE DR 5- 1 04(A).
23. See, e.g., New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 243, 95 N.J.L.J. 1 1 45
( 1 972) (in a real estate transaction "in all circumstances it is unethical for the same attorney to re
present buyer and seller in negotiating the terms of a contract of sale"); see also Moore, supra note 5,
at 224-225 ("Most attempts to guide practitioners merely set forth guidelines to govern specific situa
tions in which multiple representation is common." !d. at 224. "Specific guidelines can be found in
litigated court cases, in advisory ethical opinions addressed both to individual and categories of cases,
and in professional commentaries which confine themselves to particular situations . . . Unfortunately,
most commentaries which purport to give more general guidance usually end up merely summarizing
what courts and ethics committees are actually doing in narrow categories of cases." !d. at 224 n.62
(emphasis added) . As examples of such guidelines tailored to "specific situations," Professor Moore
cites In re Farr, 340 N .E:2d 777 (Ind. 1 976) (representation of host-driver and guest-passenger in
action against other driven)i'; Ohio B. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 30, reprinted in [ 1973] I FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) No. 34 AT 3 1 1 0 (JULY 1 5, 1 975) (standards for representation of spouses in no-fault divorce);
John Stewart Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the
Professional Responsibilities of the Defense A ttorney, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1 1 9, at 1 57-62 ( 1 978) (dis
cussing the ethical propriety of representing criminal codefendants); D. Kent Meyers, Ethical Consid
erations in the Representation of Multiple Creditors Against a Single Debtor, 5 1 AM. BANKR. L.J. 19,
26-30 ( 1 977) (representing multiple parties in bankruptcy actions); Note, Simultaneous Representa
tion: Transaction Resolution in the Adversary System, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 86, 94- 1 1 6 ( 1 977)
(uncontested divorce, formation of close corporation and sale of real estate); Moore, supra note 5, at
224 n.62).
24. See, e.g., Robert H. Aronson, Conflict of !merest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807 ( 1 977).
25. See, e.g., Gary T. Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64
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particular factual context, such as joint representation in criminal cases, is
further subdivided into even smaller niches, such as joint representation of
witnesses appearing before a grand jury and joint representation of charged
criminal defendants. The contextual inclination reflects the attitude that
'
each particular context presents conflict of interest problems which are
unique. 26
A contextual approach to attorney conflict of interest issues has much to
recommend it. Dividing any complicated subject makes pragmatic sense in
attempting to conquer it. Partitioning the seemingly limitless variety of at
torney conflict of interest problems renders them more manageable, and
one way to partition them is by factual context. The contextual approach
may aid in developing rules which are sensitive to the nuances and needs of
particular factual settings, such as divorce or joint criminal representation.
In addition, compartmentalization by factual context may facilitate com
parison of cases within a particular context and thus promote consistency
of treatment within that particular context.
Despite its appeal, and perhaps in part because of it, the contextual incli
nation has its dangers. In the broad landscape of conflicts doctrine, it may
produce what appears from a panoramic perspective to be a patchwork
with little consistency from one factual setting to another and no discern
ible relationship to any larger view about how conflict of interest should be
handledY In other words, while a contextual approach may promote con
sistency within a particular factual setting, it runs the risk of reducing con
sistency between different contexts and of undermining the development of
a clear larger picture. Energy and attention may become so focused on
questions arising in particular contexts that treatment of the common ele
ments which all conflict of interest questions present may be given short
shrift. Treating the rules for each context as sui generis may distract and
discourage one from developing a consistent and uniform general approach
to conflict of interest problems. A leading treatise states that:
[C]onflict of interest problems are pervasive in law practice and can arise
early, late, and at intermediate points throughout a representation in a
VA. L REv. 939 ( 1978); Geer, supra note 23.
26. See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 24, at 808-09 ("Within each area of the law and form of legal

practice the conflict of interest problems are unique, calling for individualized and imaginative
treatment.").
27. See Murray L . Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL L REv.
669, 670 ( 1978 ) ("The lack of definite answers to professional questions can in large part be explained
by the absence of a general, coherent theory of professional behavior for lawyers . . . One consequence
of the absence of any general theory is that lawyers often respond to professional problems in ad hoc,
pragmatic ways, redclining the issues to avoid reaching the ethical question. Such an approach, while
not manifestly illegitimate, is a very limited and intellectually unsatisfactory way of responding to
professional problems.").
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bewildering variety of shapes and sizes. One should not, therefore, press
too hard the question of general standards in a search for underlying
ordering principles. 28
This article takes the position that. we have not pressed hard enough the
question of "general standards" and the "search for underlying ordering
principles" in the area of conflict of interest. It seeks to facilitate the devel
opment of a broader perspective to balance conflict of interest doctrine's
predilection to contextualism. Its purpose is not to displace the contextual
approach but rather to balance it. The problem is not so much with the
contextual approach itself but rather that we have ignored simultaneously
developing a more universal framework within which to fit particular ad
hoc rules. It may be wise to maintain or even to increase our reliance upon
context specific rules. Nonetheless, we need a universal vocabulary and
framework within which to fit contextual rules.
As the prior paragraphs make clear, one of the dangers of contextual
thinking is that it may keep us from discerning the elements which are
common to all conflict of interest problems. A necessary first step in devel
oping a clear and structured approach to a problem is to understand the
nature of the problem. It is to this topic that we next turn.
B.

THE COMMON E LE M E NT I N CONFLICT O F I NT E REST

Questions involving attorney conflict of interest vary in apparent form
and arise in widely disparate factual settings. Indeed, it is this feature of
variability which makes conflict of interest lend itself readily to a contex
tual approach. Consider, for example, the following motley assortment of
attorney conflict of interest issues. May a prosecutor sell the media rights
to portrayal of her character in a highly publicized case? 29 Is it permissible
for a defendant in a civil rights case to propose a settlement offer condi
tioned on the plaintiff's waiver of attorney's fees?30 May a single lawyer
represent both husband and wife in a divorce,31 the buyer and seller m a
28. WOLFRAM, supra nott7 I I, § 7. 1 .3, at 3 1 6 (emphasis added).
29. See N.Y. State Bar AtiSs'n Op. 606, 2 1 -89 (Nov. I, 1 990). (Upon completion of a criminal prose
cution, assistant district attorney may sell her media rights and participate in the development of her
character in a screenplay or other literary medium, so long as client's confidential information is not
revealed.)
30. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U .S. 7 1 7 ( 1 986). (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1 976
interpreted as not generally prohibiting settlements conditioned on waiver of plaintiff's attorney's fees.
/d. at 737-38). Cf Bar Ass'n of the City of N.Y. Op. 80-94 ( 1 980) (stating that it is unethical for a
defendant to make an offer of settlement in "public interest" cases conditioned on waiver of plaintiff's
attorney's fees) (Withdrawn after Evans opinion. Bar Ass'n of the City of N.Y. Op. 87-4 ( 1 987) ).
3 1 . See Levine v. Levine, 436 N.E.2d 476 (N.Y. 1 982) (holding that the joint representation of a
husband and wife in a separation proceeding by a single attorney is insufficient alone to require rescis
sion of the agreement).
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residential real estate transaction32 or companies which are business com
petitors? 33 Should sexual involvement with a client,34 the spouse of a cli
ent35 or opposing counseP6 preclude the lawyer from representing the cli
ent? If a lawyer represents a brokerage firm under investigation for
securities fraud, may he simultaneously represent an individual employee
of the firm appearing before the grand jury which has targeted the em
ployee as a source of information about the firm's alleged wrongdoing?37 If
a lawyer is herself under criminal investigation and cooperating with inves
tigating authorities, may she represent clients in criminal matters?38 Must
a law firm remove a lawyer from a case because the lawyer's race, sex,
religion or ethnic background is likely to arouse the prejudice of a particu
lar judge or jury?39
What do attorney media rights transactions have in common with settle
ment offers conditioned on fee waivers, the sexual relations of lawyers, or
joint representation of a company and one of its employees during the in
vestigatory phase of a criminal proceeding? A contextualist might well an
swer that these questions are more dissimilar than they are alike, empha32. See In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1 974) (holding that an attorney merits reprimand for
representing both vendor and purchaser without fully advising the parties of areas of potential conflict
and for failing to withdraw when conflict arose).
33. See Curtis v. Radio Representatives, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 729, 734-37 (D. D.C. 1 988) (holding that
no violation of conflict of interest rules exists in the simultaneous representation of business
competitors).
34. See United States v. Babbitt, 26 M.J. 1 57 (C.M.A. 1 988); In re McDow, 354 S. E.2d 383
( 1 987); Cal. Formal Op. 1 987-92; AI. Op. 88-0 1 ( 1 988). California has recently considered enacting
the first absolute ban in the United States on lawyer-client sexual relations. See Philip Hager, Lawyer
Clielll Sex May Be Banned by State Bar, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2 1 , 1 99 1 , at A3, col. 5. For a discussion of
the issue of sexual relations between lawyer and client in the context of divorce representation, see
Lawrence Dubin, Sex and the Divorce Lawyer: Is the Client Off Limits, 1 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 585
( 1 988).
35. See People v. Singer, 275 Cal. Rptr. 9 1 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 990) (holding that defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel was violated by conflict of interest arising from undisclosed affair be
tween defense counsel and defendant's wife).
36. See People v. Jackson, 2 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 5 2 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 98 5 ) (holding that a defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel was violated by conflict of interest arising from undisclosed "sustained
dating relationship" between defense counsel and prosecutor).
37. See Laurie P. Cohen, Issue of Lawyer's Loyalty is Raised by Drexel Employee's Conviction,
WALL ST. J., March 24, 1 989, at B3.
38. See United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1 990) (holding that the fact that defense
counsel was under investigation before and during defendant's trial for crimes unrelated to the crimes
with which the defendant was charged did not constitute a sufficient conflict of interest to result in a
per se violation of defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. McCloy, 574
A.2d 86 ( Pa. Super. 1 990) (holding that the fact that defense counsel was cooperating in an FBI
investigation unrelated to the charges against the defendant did not constitute a sufficient conflict of
interest to amount to a violation of defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel); United States v.
Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1 984) (reversing criminal conviction on the grounds that trial counsel
may have engaged in criminal conduct related to the conduct for which the defendant was on trial).
39. See GI LLERS & DoRSEN, supra note 1 8, at 6 1 3- 1 5 (simulated case history).
.
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sizing the considerable variations in the factual contexts of each of these
questions. Despite wide variations in form and context, however, the com
mon feature which brings each of these questions within the doctrinal niche
labeled "conflict of interest" is concern with the existence of some particu
lar incentive which threatens the effective and ethical functioning of a
lawyer.
Take, for example, the question whether a prosecutor should be permit
ted to sell the media rights to portrayal of her character.40 Allowing such a
sale creates a financial incentive for the prosecutor to increase the value of
those rights in order to advance her own economic self-interest. This finan
cial incentive puts at risk a number of different facets of the prosecutor's
professional functioning, since many of the prosecutor's decisions and ac
tions affect the value of her media rights.
The prosecutor's initial exercise of prosecutorial discretion whether or
not to prosecute the case, for example, is threatened since a decision not to
prosecute would in most instances reduce the value of the prosecutor's me
dia rights. As the portrayal of lawyers in popular media makes clear, a
trial makes for more interesting and dramatic media fare than a guilty
plea,41 raising concern that the prosecutor's decision whether and on what
terms to enter into plea negotiations with the defendant is at risk of being
influenced by concern for media value. Similar concerns may be raised
about the prosecutor's ethical obligations of confidentiality, public com
ment to the press and strategic decisions such as what witnesses to call at
trial or what matters to emphasize during closing argument. Each of these
decisions and actions presents the prosecutor with an opportunity to yield
to the incentive to promote her financial self-interest.
All of the conflict of interest questions posed at the outset of this section
raise the issue of some particular incentive which threatens to impair an
attorney's functioning. A settlement offer in a civil rights case conditioned
on the plaintiff's waiver of attorney's fees creates a financial incentive
which threatens the plaintiff's lawyer's function in providing impartial ad40. For discussion of the issue of media rights transactions, see, e.g., Richardson R. Lynn, Restrict
ing Attorney Speech about Mjttters of Recent Employment, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 5 3 1 ( 1982); Martin S.
Goldberg, Note, Publication Rights Agreements i n Sensational Criminal Cases: A Response t o the
Problem, 68 CORNELL L. R EV. 686 ( 1 983); Jill A. Sperber, Note, Publication Rights Fee Contracts
Between Attorneys and Criminal Defendants: Waiving the Right to Counsel, 1 7 U.S.F. L. REv. 549
( 198 3); Keith Noel Bond, N ote, Comracting for Publication Rights in Lieu of Attorney 's Fees in
Criminal Cases, 3 1 BuFF. L . REV. 483 ( 1 982); Claire Hamner, Note, Conflict of Interests When A ttor
neys Acquire Rights to the Client 's Life Story, 6 J. LEG. PROF. 299 ( 1 981); Bruce I. Favish, Note,
Conflicting Interests in Lawyer-Client Publication Rights Agreemellfs-The Story of Bobby Joe Max
well, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 869 (1981).
4 1 . See Kevin McMunigal, The Costs of Settlemem: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on
Litigating Lawyers, 3 7 UCLA L. REv. 8 3 3 , 834 ( 1 990) ("Images of lawyers in trial dominate popular

media such as novels, films, and television.").
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vice to his client about the settlement offer.42 The fact that the settlement
offer leaves the plaintiff's lawyer uncompensated gives the plaintiff's lawyer
a financial incentive to advise against the settlement. Sexual involvement
by a lawyer with the spouse of a client in a criminal case may give the
lawyer an emotional incentive to reduce the efforts expended in defense of
the client. Simultaneous representation of a brokerage firm and an em
ployee of the firm during a grand j ury investigation threatens the function
ing of the lawyer providing the joint representation in a number of ways.43
For example, if the individual employee were called before a grand jury
seeking information about her employer's alleged wrongdoing, the fact that
the lawyer also jointly represents the employing firm, a future source of
business for the lawyer, creates an incentive for the lawyer not to urge the
individual client to tell the truth to the grand jury. Such action would pro
tect the employer but place the individual at risk of a perjury conviction.44
Each of these questions raises the issue of threat posed to an attorney's
functioning. In other words, these questions require one to deal with the
issue of risk of impairment of an attorney's functioning. Factual permuta
tions on this basic theme of threatened impairment are virtually inex:haust
ible. The questions above suggest just a few of the possible variations. In
some, the source of the threat is the financial or personal interest of the
lawyer. In others, it is the interests of another client or of a third party. In
some, the threat seems narrowly focused on a particular facet of the attor
ney's functioning, such as performance as trial advocate or as advisor in
connection with a grand jury appearance. In others, the risk involves multi
ple facets of the lawyer's representation.
Another way of describing the common element of conflict of interest is
through the language of economics. Economists use the term "agency cost "
to express the concern that an agent may not always act in the best inter
ests of the principal, even though the agent is legally required to do so.45
42. See infra Part I I I . B. I.b.
43. For discussion of some of the problems which arise in representing multiple clients during a
grand jury investigation, see Nancy J. Moore, Disqualification of an A ttorney Represeming Multiple
Witnesses Before a Grand Jury: Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27 UCLA L. REv. I ( 1979).
44. For a discussion of the tension between a corporation's interests and those of its employees during a criminal investigation, see Kathryn W. Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the
Employee Owed More Protection Than the Model R ules Provide?, 23 INDIANA L. R EV. 1 ( 1990).
45. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen and William H . Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav
ior. A gency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 ( 1976): Agency costs are typi
cally delined to include both the costs of monitoring the agent's fidelity to his obligations as well as the
residual losses incurred when the agent is unfaithful to his obligations. See. e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Govemance Movement, 35 YAND. L. REv. 1259, 1263 n. l l ( 1982) ("A fi rm's agency costs
include monitoring costs that arise from the agency relationship, as well as the agent's bonding expendi
tures and the residual loss attributable to the divergence in i nterest between principals and agents.") .
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The problem of agency cost is inherent in any agency relationship,46 includ
ing that between lawyer and client. The concept of agency cost has been
described as "essentially a formal statement of a problem that the law has
long recognized and addressed under the heading of conflict of interest. "47
Whatever the terminology used, the primary task of conflict of interest
doctrine is to formulate a response to situations which pose a threat of
impairment to an attorney's functioning. Perhaps the most fundamental
ambiguity in conflict of interest doctrine is its uncertainty about what ap
proach to adopt in responding to such threats, a subject examined in the
following section.
II. THE RESPONSE TO THREAT OF IMPAI RMENT
Why do we need conflict of interest rules? The simple, intuitive response
is that we need to protect the integrity of an attorney's functioning. But
one might view a separate set of conflict of interest rules as unnecessary for
achieving this goal. In other words, it could be argued that existing con
straints other than conflicts rules are sufficient to check any impairment
threat. A particular incentive giving rise to conflict of interest concerns is
only one of a constellation of incentives and constraints which simultane
ously exert pressure on a lawyer. A number of incentives and constraints
reinforce the attorney's resistance to impairment pressure, helping to check
incentives which threaten to compromise the lawyer's functioning. Sanc
tions for violation of lawyer rules of conduct separate from the conflict of
interest rules, such as those imposing the substantive obligations of compe
tence and confidentiality, are available through professional discipline, civil
liability and loss or reduction of fees if the lawyer actually provides im
paired service. Competition in the market for legal services also provides an
incentive for the lawyer not to accede to impairment pressure, lest he lose
the client to another lawyer.48 One might view such incentives and con
straints as powerful enough to keep risk of impairment from materializing
into actual impairment. If more preventive power is needed, an adherent to
this viewpoint would argue that we need simply to increase either the se
verity or the cert:}inty of the sanctions for violation of the rule of conduct
violated. A response to threats of attorney impairment based on this view
would draw the boundary line between permissible and impermissible con
duct at the point of actual impairment of the lawyer obligations which exist
46. Fischel, supra note 45, at 1263 n . l 0.
47. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, New Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEo.
WASH. L REV. 582, 594 ( 1984).
48. See Fischel, supra note 45, at 1263 ("The market also plays a valuable role in minimizing

agency costs.").
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apart from the conflict of interest provisions.
The very fact that conflict of interest doctrine exists demonstrates im
plicit rejection of the view sketched above. Rather, the doctrine seems
based on the assumption that we need something more to protect against
threats of impairment. Its very existence seems to demonstrate a felt need
for something more than what is offered by the position sketched above.
Just as in criminal law the development of various inchoate crimes demon
strates a felt need to supplement sanctions focusing on resulting harm, the
existence of conflicts rules seems to indicate a feeling that the rules which
define and protect various roles and obligations of lawyers aside from the
conflict rules, are insufficient to protect against threats of attorney impair
ment.49 Exactly what else is needed, however, has proven elusive.
Three different conceptions of the appropriate response to incentives
which threaten attorney impairment compete for expression in current con
flict of interest doctrine. Each provides a distinct reference point for estab
lishing the boundary between permissible and impermissible attorney con
duct in conflict of interest situations. An appearance approach prohibits
conduct which appears improper. A risk avoidance approach prohibits con
duct which creates unacceptable risk of impairment. A resulting impair
ment approach prohibits conduct which either results in or is certain to
result in impairment.
The thrust of Part I I is that current doctrine does a poor job of utilizing
these conceptual approaches. It fails to distinguish them clearly and to rec
ognize their inconsistencies. Competition among these approaches results in
conceptual confusion which is a primary source of ambiguity in current
conflict of interest doctrine. This conceptual confusion is mirrored in the
verbal confusion found in the terminology of conflict of interest doctrine.
A. THE THREE COMPETIN G CONCEPTIONS
In examining current doctrine's utilization of these three approaches,
this Part begins with the resulting impairment and risk avoidance ap
proaches and then proceeds to the appearance approach. In order to under
stand and distinguish between the risk and resulting impairment ap
proaches, it is critical to grasp the distinction between conduct which
creates risk of impairment and conduct which actually results in impair
ment. Failure to recognize this relatively simple distinction between risk
49. Sometimes conflicts rules are justified on the ground that they are preventive in rationale. But it
is important to note that the approach just sketched is, in fact, a preventive approach. I t seeks to
prevent impairment by reinforcing internal constraints with penalties for actual impairment, just as the
criminal penalty for murder with its requirement of a resulting death may be justified on the ground of
deterring intentional killing.
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and result is a fundamental and pervasive problem in conflict of interest
doctrine.50 The distinction has proved so elusive in the conflict of interest
area that some elaboration on the distinction at this point is useful in order
to make certain it is firmly grasped. Analogies from criminal law are help
ful to illustrate this distinction and its implications for formulating conflict
of interest doctrine.
Certain crimes by definition require a particular result. A vehicular
homicide statute punishing reckless or negligent driving which causes a
death provides an example of this sort of crime.51 Other crimes are defined
without reference to the occurrence of a particular result. Such crimes fo
cus instead on risk, the tendency of the conduct in question to cause a
particular result. A reckless driving statute punishing driving which creates
an unacceptable level of risk provides an example of this sort of crimeY
The question of whether and to what degree the criminal law should rely
on risk or resulting harm in formulating criminal offenses and prescribing
punishment has been the focal point of considerable debate. In both defin
ing and grading offenses, the criminal law has traditionally tended to at
tach great significance to resulting harm. Under both the common law and
traditional American criminal codes, the incorporation of a resulting harm
requirement was a standard feature, while prosecution of conduct which
created risk but did not actually cause resulting harm was left to ad hoc
statutory crimes "narrowly focused on limited classes of conduct."53 In the
area of grading, this same philosophy was exemplified in the law of at
tempt. Attempts have traditionally been, and in many jurisdictions still are,
punishable at only a small fraction of the punishment assigned to com
pleted crimes.54
The criminal law's traditional emphasis on resulting harm has been chal
lenged by scholars questioning why the occurrence of a particular result
50. See infra Part I I. B. At times the distinction is clearly recognized. For a particularly clear treat
ment of the distinction between risk and resulting impairment in attorney conflict of interest doctrine,
see FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at 1 75.
5 1 . See, e.g., O HIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.07 (Baldwin 1 9 9 1 ) ("(A) No person, while operating or
'
participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or
a ircraft, shall negligently c a'C se the death of another. (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of
vehicular homicide, a misdemeanor of the first degree").
52. See. e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 451 1 .20 ( Baldwin 1 99 1 ) ("No person shall operate a vehicle,
trackless trolley, or streetcar on any street or highway in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of
persons or property.").
53 . Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 498 (5th ed.
1 98 9 ) .
54. !d. at 6 2 1 -22. ("At common l a w attempts were misdemeanors. Today t h e usual punishment
grading system for attempt involves making it punishable by a reduced factor of the punishment for the
completed crime. In California (Cal. Penal Code § 664) attempt carries a maximum term of not more
than one-half of the highest maximum term authorized for the completed offense.")
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should affect criminal liability. Examination and debate of the issue of the
role of resulting harm has given rise to a substantial body of scholarship.5s
Critics of the criminal law's traditional emphasis on resulting harm argue
that the proper focus of penal law is on risk creation rather than resulting
harm. From both the deterrence and incapacitation points of view, conduct
which creates undue risk is an appropriate object of criminal sanction re
gardless of whether it happens to result in harm on a particular occasion.
From a retributive point of view, the moral blameworthiness of a defendant
derives from his conduct and the mental state which accompanies that con
duct, not from the fact that harm in fact results, which often turns on some
fortuity outside the control of the defendant.56
What is there to learn from the criminal analogy? First, criminal law
has achieved clarity as to when results are required and when they are not.
In other words, we know what role resulting harm plays under a vehicular
homicide statute and under a reckless driving statute. It is a prerequisite in
vehicular homicide and irrelevant for reckless driving. Second� there has
been extensive debate on the question of the role of resulting harm in crim
inal law, a debate which has informed the evolution of substantive criminal
law doctrine. In the area of conflict of interest, we have failed to achieve
either one. Conflict of interest doctrine frequently is unclear about the dis55. For a discussion of attitudes favoring an emphasis on actual harm, see G LANVILLE WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW-THE G ENERAL PART, § 49, at 1 36 (2d ed. 1 96 1 ) ("The only theory of punishment
that explains the present law [punishing attempts Jess severely than the completed crime] is a crude
retaliation theory, where the degree of punishment is linked rather to the amount of damage done than
to the intention of the actor."); Meir Dan Cohen, Causation, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND Jus
TICE 1 65 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1 983) ("That the actual death of the victim is somehow relevant to
determining the accused's criminal liability is nonetheless a widely shared and deeply entrenched intui
tion . . Although [this] intention itself resists rationalization by reference to the goals of criminal law,
it can still be demonstrated that the fact of its existence and pervasiveness is relevant to the criminal
law's ability to discharge its main functions . . . . "). For a discussion of attitudes favoring an emphasis
on risk creation, see Stephen J . Schulhofer, Harm and Punishmelll: A Critique of Emphasis on the
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 1 22 U. PA. L. REv. 1 497 ( 1 974). See also Herbert Wechsler,
The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 H ARV. L REV. I 097, II 06 ( 1 952) (" From the preventive
point of view, the harmfulness of conduct rests upon its tendency to cause the injuries to be prevented
far more than on actual results; results, indeed, have meaning only insofar as they may indicate or
dramatize the tendencies involved."); H .LA. H ART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 52-53
( 1 965); SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 3 1 1 (I 883);
Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code, and in the
Common Law, 1 9 RuTGERS L R Ev 725 ( 1 988); J.C. Smith, The Element of Chance in Criminal
Liability, 1 97 1 C RIM. L R Ev 63, 74-75 ( 1 97 1 ) .
56. A similar debate has recently emerged concerning the role of resulting harm in tort law. See
Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UC LA L REv.
439, 439 ( 1 990) (arguing that "corrective justice requires, as a regulative ideal, that we be held liable
when we have increased the risk of harm occurring, whether or not it eventually does"); see also Ken
neth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L REv.
1 1 3 ( 1 990) ; Christopher H . Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law, 38
UC LA L. REV. 1 43 ( 1 990).
.

.
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tinction between resulting impairment of a lawyer's functioning and risk of
impairment. Nor has there been extensive debate on the roles of resulting
impairment and risk in formulating conflict of interest doctrine.
1. The Resulting Impairment Approach
A pure resulting impairment approach dictates concern only with actual
impairment of a lawyer's functioning. The idea here is to monitor the ac
tual point of impairment, making sure no lawyer goes beyond it. Like a
criminal statute which prohibits only conduct resulting in actual harm, this
approach draws the boundary between permissible and impermissible con
duct at the point where the lawyer's functioning is actually compromised.
Just such a pure resulting impairment approach seems to be reflected in
the attorney conflict of interest rules concerning business transactions be
tween an attorney and a client. Such transactions pose a high risk of im
pairing the lawyer's obligations to his client. In such transactions, the law
yer's business interest in the transaction gives him a financial incentive to
take advantage of his client. His professional training and access to client
information often provide a ready means for the lawyer to yield to this
incentive.57 In addition, due to the professional relationship, the client is
likely to be dependent on the lawyer and assume that the lawyer is protect
ing the client's interests, making the client particularly vulnerable.58 None
theless, such transactions are not prohibited. Rather, the rule generally is
that the lawyer shall not enter into such dealings with a client unless "the
transaction and terms . . . are fair and reasonable to the client. "59 In other
words, the lawyer may enter into such high risk transactions as long as he
avoids actually harming the business interests of his client.
In addition to the basic rule that the transaction must be fair and rea
sonable to the client, other ancillary rules triggered by attorney-client busi
ness deals offer the client added protection. Some of these rules operate
retrospectively. For example, courts typically closely scrutinize such trans
actions after the fact to assure their fairness.6 0 Also, when such a transac
tion is examined by a court after the fact, the burden of proof is often on
the attorney to pr.ove that the deal was in fact fair and equitable.6 1 Some
courts presume \'i ndue influence unless the attorney proves otherwise.62
Other rules operate prospectively. Requirements of full disclosure63 as well
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

GILLERS & DORSEN. supra note 1 8, at 607.
!d.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule l .8(a)( l ).
WOLFRAM, supra note I I , § 8 . 1 1 .3, at 48 1 -82.
G ILLERS & 00RSEN, supra note I 8, at 607.
/d.; see also WoLFRAM, supra note I I , § 8. I 1 .3, at 48 I .
See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule l .8(a) ( I ); MODEL CODE D R 5- 1 04(A).
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as independent advice64 make it easier for the client to protect his own
business interests from being impaired by the lawyer. But despite these
ancillary procedural protections, the final test is whether the client's busi
ness interests are actually impaired by the lawyer. In short, the approach
adopted in dealing with attorney-client business transactions seems to be a
resulting impairment approach coupled with procedural safeguards to help
in monitoring the boundary line of actual impairment.
Joint representation of criminal defendants is another situation which
poses high risk of impairment of a criminal defense attorney's function
ingY Accordingly, academic commentators have urged the adoption of an
absolute rule prohibiting such joint criminal representation.66 Such an ab
solute rule has not generally been adopted, howeverY The United States
Supreme Court has explicitly adopted a resulting impairment approach for
delineating a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights in such joint
representation situations. " [I] n order to demonstrate a violation of his
Sixth Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict
of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."6 8
A different version of the resulting impairment approach than the one
outlined above seeks to anticipate those situations in which resulting im
pairment is certain to occur and prevent them before the point of actual
impairment is reached. Such an "anticipatory" resulting impairment ap
proach maintains a focus on resulting impairment but adds a temporal
buffer by providing a means for preempting conduct which is certain to
result in actual impairment.
Portions of the general conflict of interest provisions of the Model Code
seem to reflect this anticipatory approach. D R 5 - l O l (A) sets forth the pro
hibition that a lawyer shall not accept employment if "his professional
judgment on behalf of his client will be . . . affected by his own financial,
business, property, or personal interests. "69 D R 5- l 0 5 (A) instructs that a
lawyer must decline employment if "the exercise of his independent profes
sional judgment in behalf of a client will be . . . adversely affected by the
64. See. e.g., Goldman v. Kane, 329 N . E.2d 770, 773 (Mass. 1 975) (holding that lawyer was under
a duty not to proceed with business deal with client "until he was satisfied that [the client] had ob
tained independent advice on the matter"). The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require only that
the client be given "a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel i n the transac
tion." MODEL RULES Rule 1 .8(a)(2).
65. For discussion of the risks entailed in joint criminal representation, see Lowenthal, supra note
25; Geer, supra note 2 3 ; Moore, supra note 5.
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES Rule 1 .7 cmt.; MoDEL CoDE EC 5- 1 7.
68. Cuyler v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 3 35, 350 ( 1 980).
69. MODEL CODE D R 5- I O I (A) (emphasis added).
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acceptance of the proffered employment . . . . "7 0 DR 5-l 0 5 ( B) similarly
instructs that a lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if "the ex
ercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client wUI be
"71
. . adversely affected by his representation of another client
2. The Risk Avoidance Approach
A typical response to an allegation of attorney conflict of interest is an
assertion by the attorney whose conduct is at issue that she either did not
or will not alter her representation of her client in any way.n In other
words, the attorney asserts that no actual impairment of her functioning
either has occurred or will occur. For purposes of this article, the interest
ing part of such a response is not the validity of the assertions about either
past or future impairment. The attorney may in fact be able to resist
whatever incentives pose risk in the particular situation. Rather, the inter
esting aspect of such a response is the implicit view it reflects that conflict
of interest requires resulting impairment. If one adopts a risk approach to
conflict of interest, as outlined in the following paragraphs, such a response
by a lawyer is analogous to a driver charged with reckless driving asserting
as a defense that she did not harm anyone. Lack of resulting harm is le
gally irrelevant to a reckless driving charge. Similarly, lack of actual im- 1
pairment is irrelevant to conflict of interest when viewed from a risk avoid- I
ance perspective.
The risk avoidance approach views conflict of interest rules as a rough
equivalent in legal ethics to crimes of risk creation in criminal law. Just as
these criminal statutes prohibit certain unacceptable risks to persons or
property, attorney conflict of interest rules are viewed from the risk avoid
ance perspective as prohibiting unacceptable risks to the various roles and
obligations of lawyers defined outside the conflict of interest rules. In short,
the risk avoidance approach views conflict of interest rules as telling law
yers that in addition to not actually violating the obligations set forth
outside the conflict of interest rules, they must also avoid unacceptable
risks of violating these obligations.
Much of conflict o� interest doctrine reflects a risk avoidance approach.
Indeed, it is probably the dominant theme among the three competing ap70. MoDEL CoDE DR 5 - 1 05(A) (emphasis added).
7 1 . MODE L CoDE DR 5- 1 05(B) (emphasis added).
72. See. e.g., Torassa & Holthaus, Prosecutor Confirms Tie t o 2nd Probe Figure, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, June 30, 1 99 1 , at I -A (reporting county prosecutor's friendship and political connections with
the potential target of a grand jury welfare fraud investigation. The story reports that i n response to
suggestions that she withdraw from active involvement i n the investigation due to conflict of interest,
the prosecutor stated that she did not feel the need to step aside and that "[f] riendship will not impair
the job I have to do." /d. at 4-A (emphasis added)).
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proaches. Model Code D R 5- l O l (A) sets forth the prohibition that a law
yer shall not accept employment if "his professional judgment on behalf of
his client . . reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business,
property, or personal interests."73 DR 5- 1 05 (A) states that a lawyer must
decline employment if "the exercise of his independent professional judg
ment in behalf of a client . . . is likely to be adversely affected by the
acceptance of the proffered employment . . . . "74 D R 5- 10 5 (B) requires
that a lawyer shall not continue to represent multiple clients if "the exer
cise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client . . . is
likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client
"75 Model Rule 1 .7 (b) instructs that " [a] lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests . . . ."76 These passages, with their use of "may"
and "likely," clearly suggest a concern with avoidance of the risk of
impairment.
A similar risk approach is reflected in passages from cases dealing with
attorney conflict of interest. Courts have explicitly held, for example, that
" [l]ack of actual injury to the client or profit to the attorney is no defense
to a fiduciary's breach of his duty of loyalty; the harm is in the attorney
exposing himself to the potential conflict. "77 What these passages from
both the ethics codes and case law indicate is that " [c] onflicts of interest
can exist even though no substantive impropriety has in fact occurred . . .
[T] he concept of conflict of interest turns upon reasonable possibility based
upon experience and common sense."78 Just as there were variations on the
resulting impairment approach, there are multiple variations on the risk
approach expressing a wide range of views about how much risk is accept
able. These variations are treated in detail in Part I I I . B , infra.
.

•

•

•

.

3. The Appearance Approach
The resulting impairment approach is concerned with harm to the law
yer's obligation which either has in fact occurred or is certain to occur. The
risk approach is concerned with risk of impairment which is, in fact, posed
by a particular situation. As its name suggests, the appearance approach
by contrast is concerned with the appearance of some impropriety.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

MODEL CODE DR 5- 1 0 1 (A) (emphasis added ) .
MODEL CODE D R 5- l 05(A) (emphasis added).
MoDEL CoDE D R 5- 1 05(8) (emphasis added).
MODEL RU LES Rule l .7(b) (emphasis added).
Financial General Bankshares, I nc. v . Metzger, 523
for lack of }11risdiction, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1 982).
78. fREEDMAN, s11pra note 7, at 1 77- 1 78 ( 1 990).

F.

Supp 744, 768 (D. D.C. 1 9 8 1 ) vacated
,
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The Model Code's Disciplinary Rules which follow Canon 5 and concern
conflict of interest make no mention of an appearance rationale. The
Model Code's Ethical Considerations concerning conflict of interest, how
ever, contain passages which reflect this approach. EC 5-6, for example, in
discussing the issue of a lawyer naming himself as executor or trustee in an
instrument he is drafting, advises that "care should be taken by the lawyer
to avoid even the appearance of impropriety."79 The primary authority
under the Model Code for invocation of the appearance approach, however,
is Canon 9 of the Model Code which states that "A Lawyer Should Avoid
Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."80
The appearance approach has generated a good deal of critical academic
commentary.8 1 The Model Rules' provisions do not incorporate language
which reflects an appearance approach. Deletion of Canon 9's language
was intentional. "The framers of the . . . Model Rules plainly meant to
abandon it as an independently operating standard."82 Nonetheless, the ap
pearance approach continues to be applied in some jurisdictions which have
adopted the Model Rules.83
The case law of conflict of interest contains innumerable passages which
79. MODEL CODE EC 5-6.
80. MODEL CODE Canon 9.
8 1 . See, e.g., Victor H . Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the
Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243, 264-65 ( 1 980); Howard M .
Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 N w . U.L.
REv. 996 ( 1 979); Neil D . O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: A n Elusive
Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 1 3 ( 1 979). See also Anthony G. Flynn, Note, Disqualification of
Counsel for the Appearance of Professional Impropriety, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 343 ( 1 976); Regina
Zelonker, Note, Appearance of Impropriety as the Sole Ground for Disqualification, 3 1 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1 5 1 6 ( 1 977).
82. WOLFRAM, supra note I I, § 7 . 1 .4, at 322.
83. See, e.g., First American Carriers, I nc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Ark. 1 990)
( "While Canon 9 is not expressly adopted by the Model Rules, the principle applies because its mean
ing pervades the Rules and embodies their spirit."); Burnette v. Morgan, 794 S.W.2d 1 45, 1 48 (Ark.
1 990) (The Arkansas Supreme Court recognized and "reassert[ed] that the principle is yet alive and,
though not controlling, is a rock in the foundation upon which is built the rules guiding lawyers in their
moral and ethical conduct.'1); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 536 A.2d 243, 249 (N.J. 1 988)
("Contrary to the recommiindations of [the Court's Commission on the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ] , this Court added paragraph (c) to the Model Rule 1 .7 to preserve in certain instances the
'appearance of impropriety' doctrine . . . That doctrine therefore has continuing vitality i n this state in
situations covered by RPC 1 .7, and in those situations covered by other Rules that incorporate RPC
1 .7, e.g., RPC 1 .9."); McCarthy v. Henderson, Inc., 587 A.2d 280, 283 (N.J. Super. 1 99 1 ) ("Subpara
graph (c) of RPC 1 .7 was added to the ABA model rule by our Supreme Court when the RPCs were
adopted. Its purpose is to retain the 'appearance of impropriety' doctrine in situations covered by RPC
1 .9."); Gomez v. Superior Court, 7 1 7 P.2d 902, 904 (Ariz. 1 986) ("It would appear, however, that
'appearance of impropriety,' however weakened by case law and its omission in the new Rules of Pro
fessional Conduct, survives as a part of conflict of interest and an appearance of impropriety should be
enough to cause an attorney to closely scrutinize his conduct . . . Where the conflict is so remote that
there is insufficient appearance of wrongdoing, disqualification is not required.").
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reflect the appearance approach.84 California cases, for example, utilize an
"informed speculation" standard under which conduct is prohibited if it
"naturally and reasonably gives rise to speculation that the professional
judgment of counsel [,] as well as . . . zealous representation[,] . . . has
been compromised."85 Different versions of the appearance approach ap
pear in the doctrine.
Courts that invoke the appearances standard in conflicts cases typically
cite Canon 9 of the 1 969 Code, which states that "a lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of impropriety." Beyond the initial invocation of Ca
non 9, approaches vary. Some decisions describe the appearance that is to
be avoided in terms of a violation of a more specific rule, such as the
confidentiality rules of Canon 4 or the conflict of interest rules of Canon 5 .
Still other courts purport to base disqualification solely o n Canon 9, even
if the court is not prepared to say that any specific mandatory rule has
been violated . . . . Another approach has been to take appearances of im
propriety into account as one of several factors but, at least implicitly, to
refuse to rest disqualification solely upon it.86
B. THE CURRENT CONFUSION
The treatment of culpable mental states, often referred to by the Latin .
phrase mens rea, is "the source of no end of confusion in the study and
practice of criminal law."87 One of the problems has been the "variety,
disparity and confusion" of judicial definitions of "the requisite but elusive
mental element. "88 This ambiguity in terminology reflected a failure to
identify and distinguish various underlying conceptual approaches to defin
ing the mens rea for a particular offense. A phrase such as "willful, wanton
negligence," for example, creates ambiguity, because it suggests three dif
ferent and inconsistent culpability states. Negligence suggests inadvertence.
Wanton suggests recklessness (i.e. conscious risk creation). Willful suggests
intention. 89
84. See generally WoLFRAM, supra note I I , § 7. 1 .4, at 3 1 9-22 (description of how an appearance
approach has been utilized by various courts).
85. See People v. Jackson, 2 1 3 Cal. Rptr. 5 2 1 , 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 98 5 ) ; People v. Singer, 275 Cal.
Rptr. 9 1 1 , 9 2 1 (Cal . Ct. App. 1 990) ("Even a potential conflict may require reversal if the record
supports 'an informed speculation' that appellant's right to effective representation was prejudicially
affected.")
86. WoLFRAM, supra note I I , § 7 . 1 .4, at 3 1 9-20.
87. Harold Edgar, Mens Rea, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE I 028 (Sanford H. Kadish
ed . 1 98 3 ) .
88. See Morisette v. U .S., 342 U.S. 246, 2 5 2 ( 1 952) ("The unanimity w ith which [courts] have
adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the
variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element.").
89. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 2.02 cmt.4 ( 1 985) ("As Jerome Hall has put it, the
.
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The Model Penal Code jettisoned an accumulation of archaic and ill
defined verbiage relating to mens rea, terms such as "malice," "scienter,"
"general criminal intent" and "specific criminal intent." The Model Penal
Code then replaced this "quagmire of legal refuse" with four clearly de
fined terms: "purpose," "knowledge," "recklessness" and "negligence."90
Each term reflects a different conceptual approach to defining culpability
and the definitions clearly distinguish between these concepts.9 1 By simpli
fying and clarifying both the terms and the concepts relating to culpability,
the Model Penal Code "introduced both reason and structure to a previ
ously amorphous area of Anglo-American law."92
Conflict of interest doctrine is currently in a state similar to that of the
criminal law's treatment of mens rea prior to the Model Penal Code. The
following section demonstrates that the three responses to threat of attor
ney impairment set forth above and their various permutations compete for
expression in conflict of interest doctrine in the same way that ideas such
as negligence, recklessness and intention competed for expression in mens
rea doctrine before the Model Penal Code. Conflict of interest doctrine's
failure to identify and distinguish clearly these three conceptual approaches
and to acknowledge their inconsistencies results in a state of conceptual
dissonance.
1. Terminology
A good place to begin in examining the ambiguity and inconsistency of
current doctrine is with some examples of basic doctrinal terminology.
a. The Meaning of "Conflict of Interest"
Obviously, the most basic item in the vocabulary of conflict of interest
doctrine is the phrase "conflict of interest." Although frequently used, it is
seldom defined.93 Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules, for examjudicial 'opinions ruf! in terms of 'wanton and wilful negligence,' 'gross negligence,' and more illuminat
ing yet, 'that degree of negligence that is more than the negligence required to i mpose tort liability.'
The apex of this infelicity ,�s 'wilful, wanton negligence,' which suggests a triple contradic
tion-'negligence' implying inadvertence; 'wilful,' intention; and 'wanton' recklessness.' ") .
90. Ronald L Gainer, The Culpability Provisions of t h e Model Penal Code, 1 9 RUTGERS L.J. 575,
at 575 ( 1 98 8 ) ("Of the many advances in the law contributed by the drafters of the Model Penal Code,
none appears to be of greater immediate or long-term significance than that in the area of culpability . . . For centuries, the approach to mental components of crimes had been a quagmire of legal
refus e . . . . "); Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 3 1 HAsTINGS L.J. 8 1 5, 8 1 5 ( 1 980) ("In 1 953 the Model Penal Code drafters presented what may be their most
significant and enduring achievement, a thoughtful definition of distinct levels of culpability.").
9 1 . See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 ( 1 980).
92. Gainer, supra note 90, at 575.
93. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n.3 ( 1 980) ( " 'Conflict of interests' is a term that is often
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pie, define the term. Treatments of the subject in treatises and casebooks
frequently begin not with a definition of conflict of interest, but by provid
ing examples of situations in which interests "conflict. " The reader is then
left with the task of extracting the essential characteristics of a conflict of
interest from these examples.
Perhaps the classic attempt at establishing the meaning of the term con
flict of interest is that found in Canon 6 of the American Bar Association's
1 908 Canons of Professional Ethics: "a lawyer represents conflicting inter
ests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which
duty to another client requires him to oppose. "94 This language from Ca
non 6 has been described as the way in which "conflict of interest is most
commonly defined "95 and is cited in many modern cases.96
But this alleged "definition " is not a definition. To "define " something is
"to give the distinctive properties or characteristics of a thing " or "to de
termine or describe the limits of' something.97 The language from Canon 6
makes no attempt to describe the "distinctive properties or characteristics "
of conflict of interest. It simply provides an example of one type of conflict,
that between two clients. Nor does it "determine the limits " of conflict of
interest. It excludes situations in which the lawyer's own interests or the
interests of a third party threaten the lawyer's fulfillment of her obligation
to her client, both of which are commonly included within the usage of
"conflict of interest. "
A more interesting aspect of this language from Canon 6 for the pur
poses of this article is that it suggests a resulting impairment approach.
The lawyer in the Canon 6 example is in a situation in which he must
choose between disserving one client or disserving the other. Thus, he has
reached the point of either resulting impairment or certainty of resulting
impairment of his obligations to one or the other of his clients. This sug
gests that conflict of interest does not exist until the point of impairment is
reached.
The closest the Model Code comes to explaining the term is in its definiused and seldom defined.").
94. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 ( 1 908).
95. L. Ray Patterson, An Analysis of Conflict of Interest Problems, 37 MERCER L. R EV . 569, 570
( 1 986) ("[C]onflict of interest is most commonly defined as a situation in which the lawyer has a duty
to contend for one client that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose.").
96. E.g., Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 356 n.3; Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, I nc., 646 F.2d 1 339, 1 347
(9th Cir. 1 98 1 ); Woodruff v. Tomlin, 593 F.2d 3 3 , 39 (6th Cir. 1 979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888
( 1 980); In re Gopman, 5 3 1 F.2d 262, 265 n.3 (5th Cir. 1 976); Committee on Professional Ethics &
Grievances v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 1 69, 1 7 2 n.4 (3d Cir. 1 97 1 ) ; State v. Manross, 532 N .E.2d 735, 738
(Ohio 1 98 8 ) , cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1 08 3 ( 1 989).
97. WEBSTER'S N EW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 476-77 ( Una
bridged 2d ed. 1 979) [hereinafter WEBSTER's].
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tion of "differing interests" which states that such interests "include every
interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a
lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other
interest. " 9 g Use of the words "will adversely affect" suggests again cer
tainty of future impairment and, thus, the term's concern with resulting
impairment rather than with risk.
At other times, the term conflict of interest is defined as a situation
which poses risk of impairment. One treatise instructs that "any factor that
might interfere with the exercise of [the lawyer's] independence of j udg
ment creates a conflict of interest. "99 A leading article in the field also
defines conflict of interest in terms of risk:
A conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney, or any person repre
sented by the attorney, has interests adverse in any way to the advice or
course of action which should be available to the present client. A conflict
exists whenever this tension exists even if the attorney eventually takes the
course of action most beneficial to the present client. l ao

Similarly, the Restatement defines a conflict of interest as "a substantial
risk that the lawyer's representation of the client would be materially and
adversely affected." 1 o 1
Treatment of the definition of the basic term "conflict of interest," thus,
has not maintained a clear distinction between risk and resulting harm.
Perhaps because of this ambiguity, resort has been made to an array of
modifiers. Conflicts of interest have been described, among other things, as:
"potential," "actual," 1 02 "latent," "acute,"1 03 "deep," 1 04 "relevant,"1 05 "sub
jective, " "objective, " 1 06 "per se. " 1 07 Occasionally adverbs are called upon in
drawing distinctions regarding conflict of interest. For example, language
from a Supreme Court case attempts to draw a distinction on the basis of a
lawyer "actively" representing conflicting interests. This language suggests
98. MODEL CODE Definition ( I ) (emphasis added) .
99. L. PATTERSON, supra note 4 , at 4- 1 (emphasis added).
I 00. Aronson, supra note 24, at 809.
1 0 1 . R ESTATEMENT (THIRD). OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW YERS § 201 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1 99 1 ) (hereinafter RESTATEMft<i'T).
1 02. E.g., MODEL RULES Rule 1 .7 cmt. [ I ] ; In re Porter, 584 P.2d 744, 747 (Or. 1 978).
1 03 . In re Lanza, 322 A.2d 445, 447 (N.J. 1 974).
1 04. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 1 .8:50 1 , at 27 1 n. l (referring to the case of Maxwell v.
Superior Court, 639 P.2d 248 (Cal. 1 982), "the conflict of interest was so deep that a waiver should
have been prohibited as a matter of public policy") (emphasis added).
I 05. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 355 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The appropriate question under the Sixth
Amendment is whether an actual, relevallt conflict of interests existed during the proceedings.") (emphasis added).
I 06. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 1 2.2, at 705-08 (3d ed.
1 989) (using the terms "subjective" and "objective" to describe conflicts of interest).
1 07. Patterson, supra note 95, at 572.
·
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that some form of "passively " representing conflicting interests i s allowa
ble. 1 0K These adjectives and adverbs, in turn, are seldom defined.
b. The "Actual " vs. "Potential " Distinction
Two adjectives frequently used to modify the term conflict of interest are
"potential " and "actual. " 1 09 The adjective "potential " means something
"that can, but has not yet, come into being. " 1 1 0 Since risk itself refers to
harm which is capable of occurring but has not yet occurred, use of the
term "potential " connotes a focus on risk. This seems clear enough if the
term "conflict of interest " itself is thought of as requiring resulting impair
ment. Then the phrase "potential conflict of interest " would simply mean
risk of impairment. Thus, a potential conflict is sometimes defined as
describing a situation in which impairment is likely. 1 1 1 However, the phrase
"potential conflict of interest " becomes ambiguous if one thinks of the term
"conflict of interest " itself, as it is often used, as describing a situation
presenting a risk of impairment. If the term "conflict of interest " is under
stood in this risk sense, as it often is, then adding the word "potential "
seems redundant. Taken literally, it would mean the potential of potential
harm, that is, a risk of a risk.
The adjective "actual " means "existing at the present time. " 1 1 2 This
term suggests a concern with actual impairment. As with the adjective
"potential, " however, ambiguity arises when "actual " is combined with the
term "conflict of interest. " If the term "conflict of interest " is understood
itself to mean a situation of resulting impairment, then the adjective "ac
tual " seems redundant. If "conflict of interest " is understood to describe a
situation presenting a risk of impairment, then use of the term "actual, "
implying that something already has happened, seems contradictory since
risk suggests something m the future which is threatening but has not yet
happened.
I 08. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U .S. 776, 783 ( 1 987) ("We have never held that the possibility of
prejudice that 'inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,' justifies the adoption of an
inflexible rule that would presume prejudice in all such cases . . . I nstead, we presume prejudice 'only
if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an ac
tual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." ") (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at
348, 350; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, . 692 ( 1 984) ) .
1 09. See, e.g., MoDEL RuLEs Rule 1 .7 cmt. [ I ] ("The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures,
appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation
matters the parties and issues i nvolved and to determine whether there are aclllal or potential conflicts
of interest.") (emphasis added).
1 1 0. WEBSTER's, supra note 97, a t 1 409.
I l l . See In re Porter, 584 P.2d 744, 747 (Or. 1 978) (stating that a "potential" conflict of interest is
one in which the lawyer's independent professional judgement "is likely to be adversely affected . . . ")
(emphasis added).
1 1 2. WEBSTER's, supra note 97, at 20.
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"Actual" conflict of interest is sometimes used to refer to impairment
which has already taken place. Indeed, a leading commentator states that
"[w] hen commentators refer to an 'actual' conflict of interest, they ordina
rily mean that the substantive impropriety that the conflict of interest rule
was designed to prevent h as in fact taken place." 1 1 3 At other times, actual
conflict is defined as meaning a prospective certainty of impairment. 1 1 4 At
still other times, the word "actual," when used to modify conflict of inter
est, has been explicitly defined as referring to a situation presenting an
intolerable amount of risk, not actual impairment or certainty of actual
impairment. The Supreme Court, for example, has stated that " [a] n ar
rangement represents an actual conflict of interest if its potential for mis
conduct is deemed intolerable. The determination of whether there is an
actual conflict of interest is therefore distinct from the determination of
whether that conflict resulted in any actual misconduct."1 1 5 It is a poor
word to convey the idea of prospective impairment regardless of the degree
of probability, because it suggests that whatever it modifies has already
happened.
Rather than clarifying the ambiguity in the phrase "conflict of interest,"
the words "potential " and "actual" simply continue and compound the
confusion.
2. Commentators and Codes
The confusion found in the vocabulary of conflict of interest reflects an
underlying conceptual confusion as to the appropriate response to situations
which threaten attorney impairment found both in commentators and eth
ics codes dealing with conflict of interest. Both ethics codes and commenta
tors have treated the choice of appropriate response ambiguously.
a. Commentators
Take, for example, the treatment of choice of response found in one of
the classic works in the field, Henry Drinker's Legal Ethics . 1 16 Published in
195 3, it is cited in modern conflict of interest cases and commentary. 1 1 7 In
his section on conflicl of interest, D rinker notes that the lawyer is forbidden
1 1 3. FREEDMAN, supra note 7, at I 8 1 (emphasis added) .
1 1 4. See In re Porter, 5 8 4 P.2d a t 747 ( a n "actual" conflict of interest i s one in which "the lawyer's
independent professional judgment . . . will be adversely affected").
1 1 5. Young v . United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 48 1 U.S. 787, 807-08 n . l 8 ( 1 987).
1 1 6. H ENRY DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS ( 1 95 3 ) . Drinker was chairman of the American Bar Associa
tion Standing Committee on Ethics and G rievances from 1 944 to 1 958.
1 1 7. See, e.g., In re Porter, 584 P.2d at 748 (citing DRINKER, supra note 1 1 6, i n regard to a conflict
of i nterest issue); Aronson, supra note 24, at 8 1 3; Patterson, supra note 95, at 570 n.4.
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t o accept representation "from others in matters adversely affecting any
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. "1 1 H
Use of the words "adversely affecting" in this passage suggests a pure re
sulting impairment approach. Drinker quotes from a case which provides
that " [t]he test of inconsistency is . . . whether his accepting the new re
tainer will require him . . . to do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client . . . . " 1 1 9 Again this language is consistent with a resulting
impairment approach, though this time in its anticipatory form. Drinker
also quotes the passage from Canon 6 of the 1908 Canons discussed in the
preceding subsection of this article on the vocabulary of conflict of interest,
Part I I . B. l .a supra, stating that "a Ia wyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty
to another cl ient requires him to oppose." 1 2 0 As noted earlier, this passage
suggests a resulting impairment approach since the lawyer in the example
in the quoted passage is at the point of actual impairment of his obligations
to one or the other of the two clients he represents.
Drinker also instructs that the duty to avoid conflict of interest requires
"not only the avoidance of a relation which will obviously and presently
involve the duty to contend for one client what his duty to the other pres
ently requires him to oppose, but also the probability or possibility that
such a situation will develop. " 1 2 1 Here a risk avoidance approach is clearly
expressed . The fact that this sentence simultaneously expresses two differ
ent versions of a risk approach, one prohibiting probable and the other pos
sible impairment, adds to the ambiguity. Drinker returns to the risk ap
proach with the admonition that a lawyer "should avoid not only situations
where a conflict of interest is actually presented, but also those in which a
conflict is likely to develop." 1 22 Drinker also quotes Justice Story in Wil
liams v. Reed asserting that " [w] hen a client employs an attorney, he has a
right to presume, if the latter be silent on the point, that he has no engage
ments, which interfere, in any degree, with his exclusive devotion to the
cause confided to him; that he has no interest, which may betray his judg
ment or endanger his fidelity."1 23 This sentence seems simultaneously to
express both resulting impairment and risk approaches.
Leaving no source of conceptual inconsistency untapped, Drinker also
suggests an appearance approach. " [E ] ven where all parties agree, the ap
pearance of a lawyer on both sides of the same controversy, particularly in
1 1 8.
1 1 9.
1 20.
121.
1 22.
1 23.

DRINKER, supra note 1 1 6, at 1 03-04 (emphasis added).
!d. at I 05 (quoting In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 952-53 ( 1 897)) (emphasis added) .
/d. at 1 03 (quoting CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 ( 1 908)).
!d. at I 04 (emphasis added).
!d. at I 05 (emphasis added).
/d. (quoting Williams v. Reed, 3 Mason 405, 4 1 8 ( 1 824)) (emphasis added).
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cases of some notoriety, will often give an impression to the public which is
most unfortunate for the reputation of the bar, and which of itself should
be decisive. " 1 24 In sum, Drinker's treatise in the space of three pages sug
gests simultaneous use of an appearance approach, multiple versions of a
resulting impairment approach, and multiple versions of a risk approach,
with no seeming awareness of the inconsistency.
Similar ambiguities are found in more modern scholarship on conflict of
interest. Take, for example, a more recent article on attorney conflict of
interest, described in conj unction with another article in a recent edition of
a leading treatise as " [t] he best general analysis of conflicts of interest
problems. " 1 25 The article1 26 begins by quoting the Canon 6 language men
tioned previously which suggests a resulting impairment approach . 1 27 It fol
lows this language by stating that the Model Code "defi n es conflict of in
terest in terms of the inherent dilution of a lawyer's loyalty toward his
·
client." 1 2R Mention of "dilution" of the lawyer's loyalty here seems to sug
gest that this passage like the passage from Canon 6 concerns resulting
impai rment. In the next paragraph, the author refers to the use by courts
and ethics committees of "certain basic ethical principles . . . in determin
ing which situations cause or are likely to cause a dilution of the loyalty or
i mpairment of the independent judgment of an attorney. " 1 29 The use of the
"cause . . . a dilution . . . or i mpairment" language suggests a resulting
i mpairment approach . The use of the "likely to cause . . . a dilution . . .
or impairment" language suggests a risk avoidance approach.
Two paragraphs later, despite the fact that these earlier passages suggest
either a resulting impairment approach or a choice between resulting im
pairment and risk avoidance approaches, the author defines conflict of in
terest in a way which clearly adopts a risk avoidance approach and explic
itly rejects a resulting i mpairment approach:
A conflict of interest exists whenever the attorney, or any person repre
sented by the attorney, has interests adverse in any way to the advice or
course of action which should be available to the present client. A conflict
exists whenever this tension exists even if the attorney eventually takes the
course of action most beneficial to the present client.130
.�

H aving just defined conflict of interest in terms of risk avoidance, the
author in the next sentence describes the possible courses of action which a
1 24.
1 25.
1 26.
1 27.
1 28.
1 29.
1 30.

/d. (emphasis added) .
HAZARD & H ODES, supra note 2 , at 2 1 7 n. l .
Aronson, supra note 24.
/d. at 808.
!d.
!d. at 809 (emphasis added).
/d.
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conscientious lawyer may take when "a conflict or potential conflict"
arises . 1 3 1 Using the alternatives of "conflict or potential conflict" a fter hav
ing just defined conflict of interest as potential impairment introduces the
ambiguity, discussed above, i nh erent in the term "potential conflict of in
terest." Either the word "potential" is simply redundant, or it literally sug
gests a focus on avoiding the risk of risk. Later the author, citing D rinker's
treatise, instructs that " [t] he key to preventing unintentional or u nwitting
violations lies in anticipating the probability or possibility that a conflict
situation will develop. " 1 32 This passage again suffers from the ambiguity of
suggesting concern with risk of risk. It also expresses two different versions
of the risk avoidance approach, one based on probable risk and the other on
possible risk.
The author also uses the term "perceived conflicts" without any explana
tion or definition . 1 33 The use of the word "perceived" suggests an appear
ance approach . The author then explicitly adopts an appearance approach,
urging that it is "particularly a pplicable to potential conflicts of interest" 1 34
but not acknowledging its inconsistency w ith the suggestions of other ap
proaches in the prior paragraphs. As with the Drinker treatise, the author
simultaneously suggests multiple approaches without clearly distinguishing
between them.
b. Ethics Codes
One finds similar problems in the Model Code's provisions on conflict of
interest. Language from the Model Code's DR 5- 1 0 1 (A) and DR's 51 05 ( A) & ( B) barring situations i n which the lawyer's professional j udg
ment "will be" affected was quoted in Part TI (A) ( l ), supra, as exemplify
ing an anticipatory resulting i mpairment approach . Language from these
same DR's barring situations in which the lawyer's professional j udgment
"reasonably may be" or "is likely to be" affected was quoted in Part
I I (A)(2), supra, as exemplifying a risk avoidance approach. The result and
risk language in each of these rules is phrased in the disj unctive. The law
yer must avoid situations in which his i ndependent judgment "will be or
reasonably may be affected" according to DR 5- l 0 1 (A) and situations in
which his independent j udgment "will be or is likely to be" affected accord
ing to DR's 5 - 1 05 (A) & (B). The language of the Model Code's EC's
makes multiple references to both actual impairment and risk of i mpair
ment, mirroring the bifurcation found in the DR's.
131.
1 32.
1 33.
1 34.

/d.
/d. at 8 1 3 (emphasis added).
/d. at 8 1 0.
/d. at 8 1 0- 1 1 .
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The Model Code's general conflict of interest rules thus contain sugges
tions of two different a pproaches, resul ting impairment and risk avoidance,
without clearly distinguishing between them. To compound this ambiguity,
the Model Code's Canon 9, as mentioned previously, provides for an ap
pearance approach. Many courts, commentators and ethics committees
have freely imported an appearance standard from Canon 9 into analysis of
conflict of interest issues arising under Canon S 's provisions . 1 35
The Model Rules conflict provisions are not as ambiguous as those of the
Model Code in terms of references to multiple standa rds. The Model
Rules ' general conflict of interest provision, Rule 1 .7, provides in part (b)
that " [a ] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially li mited," a clear reference to a risk avoidance
approach. There is no language in the actual Rule similar to the "will be
. . . affected" language in the Model Code's D R 5- l O l (A) and DR's 51 OS (A) & ( 8) .
However, the Comments t o Rule 1 .7 are more ambiguous. Comment [ 1 ]
to Rule 1 . 7 refers to "actual or potential conflicts of i nterest" without de
fining those terms. As mentioned previously, these terms have been treated
quite ambiguously in terms of underlying conceptual approach. Comment
[4] also contains some ambiguity. It provides:
Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recom
mend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of
the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect fore
closes alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Para
graph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself pre
clude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a
conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere
with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alter
natives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on
behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client
wishes to accommodate the other interest involved.
The fi rst sentence clearly provides an example of resulting i mpairment:
the lawyer's functioning is impaired because he "cannot consider, recom
mend or carry out an ippropriate course of action for the client . . . . " I n
the next sentence, the Comment mentions that " [t] h e conflict i n effect
forecloses alternatives," suggesting resulting impairment. Comment [ 4 ] 's
statement that one of " [ t] he critical questions" is whether the conflict "will
materially interfere with the lawyer's i ndependent professional j udgment"
also indicates a focus on resulting impairment. Comment [6] states that
" [t]he lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect
1 35 . See WOLFRAM, supra note I I , § 7 . 1 .4, at 3 1 9-22.
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on representation of a client. . . . A lawyer may not allow related business
interests to affect representation . . . . " Comment [9] states that " [a] lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question
that has arisen in different cases, unless representation of either client
would be adversely affected." These passages from the Comments to Rule
1 . 7 seem to reflect a resulting i mpairment approach with their emphasis on
effect on the lawyer's representation.
Other passages from the Comments reflect a risk approach, similar to
that seen in the actual text of Rule 1 .7 . Comment [4] uses the phrase "a
possible conflict . " Again, this introduces the ambiguity found in the phrase
"potential conflict."
The Restatement represents a signi ficant step forward i n clarity with re
gard to conceptual approach. I ts defin ition of conflict of interest, for exam
ple, clearly adopts a risk approach. 1 36 But elsewhere in the Restatement one
still finds remnants of the same sorts of a mbiguities found in the sources
treated above. I n the Reporter's M emorandum accompanyin g Tentative
Draft No. 3 of the Restatement's conflicts provisions, for example, a pas
sage provides that the black letter rules in the conflicts chapter state "two
i mportant concepts." First, "the general conflict-of-interest standard as
sesses whether a 'substantial risk' of a conflict exists . . . " 1 37 S i nce a con
flict is defined by the Restatement as a substantial risk, use of the phrase
" 'substantial risk' of a conflict" repeats the ambiguity explored earlier i n
the phrase "potential conflict o f i nterest" when conflict o f interest itself i s
defined in terms o f risk. L iterally, the phrase "substantial risk of a conflict"
as conflict is defined by the Restatement means substantial risk of a sub
stantial risk. This same ambiguity is seen in the Comments following Sec
tion 20 1 , which refer several times to "potential conflicts."
The second of the "two important concepts" mentioned in the Reporter's
M emorandum is that "the test for a con flict is whether a 'material and
adverse effect' will befall a client's representation because of stated inter
ests." 1 3R Choice of the words "will befall" conveys the anticipatory version
of the resulting i mpairment approach and seems to contradict both the im
mediately preceding "risk" concept put forth in the Reporter's Memoran
dum and the Restatement's basic definition of conflict of interest as involv
ing "substantial risk."
A resulting i mpairment approach is also suggested by the hypothetical
1 36. RESTATEMENT § 20 1 (a conflict of interest exists i f there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's
representation of the client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's own i nterests or
by the lawyer's duties to another current client, to a former client, or to a third person) .
1 37. RESTATEMENT (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1 990) Reporter's Memorandum to the Members of the
I nstitute at xxi.
1 38 . !d. (emphasis added ) .
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posed in I llustration 1 of the Comments following Section 20 1 . Illustration
1 presents a situation i n which the " [l] awyer's representation will h ave an
"adverse effect " on both [clients] A and B . . . . " 1 39 This illustration thus
suggests a situation of certainty of impairment, rather than one presenting
one of substantial risk. Illustration 1 also provides that " [l] awyer will have
duties to A that restrict the zeal with which the lawyer urges B's posi
tion . " 1 40 Again this suggests certainty rather than substantial risk of
impairment.
C.

R EM E DIES FOR THE CONCEPTUAL CONFUSIO N

T h e previous sections have demonstrated that a primary source of confu
sion in conflict of interest doctrine is its failure clearly to distinguish result
ing impairment, risk avoidance, and appearance approaches in formulating
its response to threats of attorney impairment. Based on the view that one
must understand a problem before one can hope to cure it, the primary
point of Part ·u is to demonstrate this confusion and the ambiguity it in
troduces i nto conflicts doctrine.
Resolution of the question of choice of conceptual approach is beyond
the scope of this article. My primary argument here is that we must rem
edy this confusion as a fi rst step toward building a comprehensible doctrine
of attorney conflict of i nterest. Clearly distinguishing different conceptual
approaches is an essential part of that process. We must reach some agree
ment on what conceptual approach or approaches are appropriate and then
clearly communicate that choice.
Conflict of interest doctrine could continue to utilize multiple approaches
and j ust do a better job of articulating and distinguishing them. To draw
again on the criminal analogy, the Model Penal Code in its treatment of
mens rea clearly defines and distinguishes four different conceptual ap
proaches to defining mens rea in an introductory section: purpose, knowl
edge, recklessness and negligence. In later sections when defining particular
offenses, it then is explicit about which type of mens rea is required for
each offense. Thus, its crime of negligent homicide is clear that negligence
is the required level of culpability and the meaning of the term negligence
'
is clearly set out in t he introductory definition.
If conflict of interest doctrine took a similar approach, the ethics codes
might start their treatment of conflict of interest with a set of definitions of
different approa�hes to the boundary between permissible and impermissi
ble attorney conduct in conflict of i nterest situations. In later sections, the
ethics codes could then choose which approach was appropriate for a par1 39. R ESTATEMENT § 20 1 cmt. 6.
1 40. /d.
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ticular situation and b y using the terms defined in the introductory section
send a clear message about the choice of conceptual approach to be used in
that setting. Resulting i mpairment might be used in some situations, risk i n
others, and appearance in still others.
A different way to clarify the confusion about conceptual a pproach
would be to eliminate certain approaches in favor of one unifying approach
to be used in a l l situations.
I II .

RISK

A voiDANCE:

THE EssENTIAL Qu ESTIONS

Part II argued that a primary source of confusion in conflict of i n terest
doctrine is its failure clearly to distinguish various conceptual approaches
in formulating its response to threat of attorney impairment. The following
section argues that another p ri mary source of confusion is current doc
trine's failure to develop clearly and completely the analytical components
of the risk avoidance approach. Analyzing attorney conflict of i nterest is
sues from a risk avoidance perspective i nvolves a series of questions con
cerning what is at risk, the definition of acceptable risk, and who decides
these questions. Current doctrine does not clearly articulate or a nswer
these essential questions.
A.

W H AT IS AT R IS K ?

I n order t o assess risk, o n e must fi rst determine what is a t risk. What
facets of a lawyer's functioning do conflict of interest rules seek to protect
from i mpairment? The a nswer to this preliminary question provides the
logical and necessary focal point for analyzing the risk of attorney i mpair
ment presented i n any particular situation. Lack of a clear answer to the
question of what is at risk is a source of confusion in present conflict of
interest doctrine.
Comparison with a criminal statute utilizing a risk approach is a useful
device for illustrating conflict of i nterest doctrine's lack of clarity in provid
ing a focal point for risk analysis. The Model Penal Code, for i nstance,
defines the crime of reckless endangerment as recklessly engaging in con
duct which creates an unacceptable risk to another person of "death or
serious bodily injury . " 1 4 1 This statute clearly states the risks with which it
1 4 1 . Model Penal Code § 2 1 1 .2, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, provides:
A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may
place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Recklessness and danger
shall be presumed where a person knowingly points a firearm a t or in the direction of an
other, whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded.
MODEL PE:-JAL CODE § 2.02(2)(C) defines recklessly as follows:
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is concerned, those o f "death o r serious bodily inj ury. " What i s the analog
in conflict of interest doctrine to "death or substantial bodily injury" in the
reckless endangerment statute?
There are many components to the functioning of a lawyer which may
be threatened with i mpairment and might comprise this analog. These
components may be described in a variety of ways. One descriptive method
is to focus on the various roles a lawyer plays, such as advisor, n egotiator,
or advocate . Another method is to focus on the set of obligations which a
lawyer must fulfill in performing these various roles. This set of obligations
includes many which are owed to the l awyer's client, such as the obliga
tions of confidentiality, 142 diligence, 143 competence 144 and zeaJ I45 in pursuing
cl ient interests. It also includes obligations owed to institutions of the legal
system within which the lawyer works, such as the duty of candor toward a
tribunal146 and the duty to monitor the factual and legal basis o f claims
asserted before a tribunal. 1 47 The lawyer owes still other obligations to
third parties, such as the obligation to communicate with a represented
party only through counsel . 1 48
Which of these roles and obligations is conflict of interest doctrine con
cerned with protecting? U n fortunately, current doctrine answers this ques
tion in rather ambiguous fashion. There are several sources of a mbiguity.
1 . Lack of Clarity in Conflict of I nterest Doctrine
Since formulating an appropriate response to risk of impairment of an
attorney's roles and obligations is the central task of attorney conflict of
interest doctrine, one m ight expect conflict of interest provisions such as
those found in the Model Code and Model Rules to make direct and ex
plicit reference to the various roles and obligations which comprise the
functioning of a lawyer. Taking a role approach, such a provision might
instruct that lawyers are to avoid unacceptable risks of impairing their
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk rn ust be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature
and purpose of the actor's '�onduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard in
volves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would ob
serve in the actor's situation.
1 42. MODE!. RULES Rule 1 .6; MODEL CODE Canon 4, DR 4- 1 0 1 .
1 43 . MODEL RcLES Rule 1 .3; MODEL CoDE D R 6- I O I (A)(3), EC 6-4.
1 44. MODEL RVLES Rule 1 . 1 ; MODEL CODE DR 6- I O I (A).
1 45. MoDEL CODE Canon 7. See also MODEL RULE 1 .3 cmt. ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." ).
1 46. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3.
1 47. MODEL RuLES Rule 3 . 1 ; MODEL CODE DR 7- ! 02(A) ( I ), (2); FED. R. C!v. P. I I ( 1 969).
1 48 . MODE!. RULES Rule 4.2; MODEL CODE DR 7- 1 04(A) ( I ).
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rqles such a s advisor, negotiator, and advocate. Taking an obligation ap
proach, it might instruct that lawyers are to avoid unacceptable risks of
i mpairing obligations such as confidentiality, diligence, competence and
zeal.
Cases and ethics opinions regarding conflict of interest often make ex
plicit reference to the underlying obligations and roles of the lawyer. 1 49 But
conflict of interest doctrine in stating its general princi ples, such as the
Model Code 's DR's and the Model R ules ' black letter rules, typically does
not take such an approach. I nstead of using the roles or obligations which
comprise the standard terminology for describing the lawyer's functioning,
the conventional approach of conflict of interest doctrine is to express what
is at risk in terms of positive obligation , which appear nowhere in the ethics
codes except in the conflict of interest provisions, such as obligations of
"loyalty" and "independent professional j udgment."
Probably the term most often used to describe what conflict of i nterest
rules seek to protect is the word "loyalty . " 1 50 It is u nclear what the term
"loyalty" means. 1 5 1 Neither the Model Code nor the Model Rules define or
explain it.1 52 One possibility is that "there is no distinct ethical i mperative
of loyalty." 1 53 According to this interpretation, loyalty is simply a short1 49. See. e.g., Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825, 829 ( 1 st Cir. 1 98 7 ) (In relation to a conflict
of interest involving the terms of a settlement, the court focused on the obligations owed by the lawyer
to the client in the context of settlement. It noted that as counsel for a class of plaintiffs the lawyer
"owed plaintiffs a duty of undivided loyalty: it was obligated to present the offer to plaintiffs, to explain
its costs and benefits, and to ensure that the offer received full and fair consideration by the members of
the class." !d. ) .
1 50. See, e.g., GI LLERS & DORSEN, supra note 1 8, at 603 ("ensuring loyalty is a primary concern of
rules that prohibit concurrent conflicts"); WoLFRAM , supra note I I , at 3 1 6 ("It is clear that there are
two broad principles underlying all conflict rules for lawyers: the principle of loyalty and the principle
of confidentiality."); MODEL CODE EC 5 - 1 ("Neither [the lawyer's] personal interests, the interests of
other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.")
and EC 5- 1 4 (" Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes
his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or
dilute his loyalty to a client."); Model Rule 1 .7 cmt. [ 1 ]- [4] (describing the requirements of the Model
Rules' general conflict of interest provision, Rule 1 .7, in terms of "loyalty to a client") .
1 5 1 . Lawry, supra note 6 , a t I 089, suggesting that the concept o f loyalty:
[ I]s not defined or explicated in any of the various codes of ethics that have dominated the
governing of American lawyers in the 20th Century. In these codes, the concept is al most
exclusively utilized in the setting of discussions about conflicts of interest. It is referred to in
those settings as if the concept itself were clear, and ditll c ulties" only arise when an issue of
divided or conflicting loyalties is present. My premise is that the concept is not clear at all.
When the conflict of interest issues arise, the use of the principle of loyalty is problematic
because we really do not have a firm grasp on the concept itself.
See also A N D R E W l. KAUFMANN. PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBI LITY 38 (3d ed. 1 989)

( "What we mean when we say a lawyer owes a 'duty of loyalty' to a client is at the core of our notion
of what kind uf adversary system we have. There is no obvious answer.").
1 5 2. Lawry, supra note 6, at I 089.
1 53 . FRHDMAS, supra note 7, at 1 74. Freedman states that "[a] Ithough loyalty is sometimes cited

1 992]

RETH I N KI N G CoNFLICT O F I NTER EST

857

hand way of describing the entire set of lawyer obligations imposed by
rules outside conflict of interest doctrine. 1 54 A variation on this interpreta
tion is that loyalty is a shorthand term for some subset of these obliga
tions . 1 55 I f this is the intended meaning, surely there is a clearer way to
convey it. Describing the focal point for conflicts anal ysis using terms
found only in the conflict of interest provisions and nowhere else in the
ethics codes conveys the con fusing message that conflict of interest is some
thing unrelated to the roles and obligations found elsewhere in the ethics
codes, rather than something intimately connected with protecting those
roles and obligations.
Does loyalty i nclude only those obligations running to the client? I n
other words, is risk of impairment of those attorney obligations running to
legal institutions or to third parties beyond conflict of interest doctrine's
sphere of concern ? A lawyer's loyalty is normally described as being owed
to the client a nd the obligations most often mentioned in connection with it
are ones owed to the client, suggesting that the obligations to legal i nstitu
tions and to third parties are beyond the province of attorney conflict of
interest doctrine. Yet Model Code EC 5-9, in describing the reasons for
inclusion of the advocate-witness rule among the Model Code's conflict of
interest provisions, mentions among other rationales for the rule that "op
posing counsel may be handicapped i n challenging the credibility of the
lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case," a ration
ale clearly grounded in the notion of fairness to an opposing party rather
than some obligation to the client.
Does loyalty include all of the obligations a lawyer has toward a client,
or j ust some of them ? One recent treatise offers the alternatives of equat
ing the term simply with the obligation of zeal or with the obligations of
zeal, competence, communication and confidentiality conjunctively . 1 56 An
other recent treatise offers the interpretation that "loyalty relates to zeal or
diligence" disj unctively, without explaining what it means by the term "re
lates . " 1 57 Unlike the fi rst treatise, which expressly includes confidentiality
as a separate ethical concern in discussions of conflicts of interest, t here is no distinct ethical imperative
of loyalty." !d.
1 54. See Lawry, supra note 6, at 1 1 02-03. Lawry quotes philosopher Josiah Royce, who defines
loyalty as "the willing . . . and thorough going devotion of a person to a cause . . .' [D]evotion to a
cause' encompasses all of the duties owed by the one loyal to that which, or to whom, the duties are
owed." ( emphasis added). !d.
! 55 . See FRHDMAN, supra note 7, at 1 74 (stating loyalty "can be equated with zeal, or it can serve
as a convenient way of saying confidentiality, zeal, competence, and communication."); RoBERT H.
ARO:\SO:oi & 001\ALD T. WECKSTEI N. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 :-J A NCTSHELL 224 (2d ed.
! 99 1 ) (asserting that " [ L]oyalty relates to zeal or diligence") .
1 56. FREEDMAN, supra note 7 , at 1 74.
! 57. ARONSON & WECKSTEIN, supra note ! 55, at 224.
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in one of its definitions of loyalty, the second treatise treats confidentiality
as not being included in the definition of loyalty . 1 58
Perhaps we should jettison the term loyalty from conflict of interest ter
minology and substitute a term, such as "the representation" or "the law
yer's professional functioning" which would serve more clearly as an aggre
gate term for the lawyer's set of ethical obligations. Referring directly to
the more concrete roles and obligations found outside the conflict rules
would simplify the analysis by allowing us to resort directly to those roles
and obligations in assessing risk without stumbling over how to i n terpret
loyalty.
Yet another possibility is that there is a distinct ethical imperative of
loyalty, that it adds some dimension to the set of obligations of a lawyer
not imposed by rules outside conflict of interest doctrine. 1 59 M ichael Bayles,
for example, treats loyalty as an obligation distinct from such other obliga
tions as diligence and competence. 1 60 If we i nterpret loyalty as adding a
distinct substantive dimension and reject the "shorthand" interpretation
advanced above, what is this added dimension ? 1 6 1 Does adoption of this
"substantive" interpretation mean that conflict of interest doctrine is not
concerned with i mpairment of other lawyer obligations?
The problem with a "substantive" interpretation of loyalty i n terms of
the clarity of conflict of interest doctrine is that it burdens conflict of inter
est rules with the task of expressing two complex ideas: the appropriate
response to threat of attorney impairment and whatever discrete dimension
loyalty is intended to add to the lawyer's set of obligations. Each alone is a
difficult task. Relying on conflict of interest doctrine to do both is simply
asking for confusion . One need not abandon the idea of giving loyalty a
distinct substantive meaning i n order to cure this problem . But if loyalty is
to add some new dimension to the lawyer's obligations, devoting a separate
section of the ethics code to establishing its meaning, just as we do for
example with confidentiality, would promote clarity.
So far we have been lookin g at loyalty as the analog to "death or sub
stantial bodily i njury" in the crime of reckless endangerment. I n other
words, we have looked to it as supplying the answer to the question of what
is protected by conflict of interest doctrine. The term loyalty is sometimes
construed as supplying the answer to a different question. Sometimes loy1 58 . !d. at 223-224 (treating loyalty and confidentiality under separate headings and stating that
" [w) hereas loyalty relates to zeal or diligence, confidentiality relates to information which the client has
entrusted to her lawyer.'").
1 59. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BAYLES. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 77-83 (2nd ed. 1 989) (describing loyalty
as an obligation distinct from those such as diligence and competence ) .
1 60. !d.
1 6 1 . See generally, Lawry, supra note 6; L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of
Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909 ( 1 980) (both discussing the possible meaning of the concept of loyalty) .
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alty is viewed a s suplying the answer t o the question o f what is the appro
priate response to threat of attorney impairment, the issue examined in
Part I I , supra. Michael Bayles, for example, states that loyalty means
"Don't allow your own i nterests or the interests of others to divert, dilute,
or diminish your efforts. " 1 62 This sounds like the resulti ng impairment ap
proach to responding to threats of attorney impairment. Kenneth Penegar
writes that " [t]he duty of undivided loyalty could be construed to mean
that the lawyer's personal life should be regulated to prevent the i mpres
sion that personal opinions are at cross-purposes with the legal position of
the client. " 1 63 This sounds like the appearance approach to responding to
threats of attorney i mpairment.
Greater clarity i n this area might be accomplished by providing clearer
definitions for existing terms such as "loyalty." Or perhaps it would be best
to jettison these terms in favor of some new and clearly defined terminol
ogy. Either way, we need to have the question of what is at risk clearly
asked and answered by conflict of i nterest doctrine in order to have a focal
point for a nalyzing risk of attorney impairment.
2. Lack of Clarity in Defining the Underlying Roles and Obligations
Once we have answered the question of what aspects of the lawyer's
functioning the con flict of interest provisions seek to protect, problems still
remain in establishing a clear focal point for analyzing risk of attorney
impairment. A separate source of con fusion in establishing this basic focal
point derives from the fact that many of the underlying obligations we are
concerned with protecting are neither static nor well defined themselves.
The assertions that lawyers owe their clients duties such as confidentiality,
diligence, competence and zeal are not controversial as abstract proposi
tions. Closer examination of such obligations, however, often reveals con
siderable disagreement about both the descriptive question of what the con
tours of such obligations presently are as well as the prescriptive question
of what the contours of those obligations ought to be. 1 64 The contours of
many of these obligations are and have been poorly defined, in a state of
transition and subject t� variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 1 65 I n
1 62. BAYLES, supra note 1 59 , at 79.
1 63. Kenneth L. Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PITT. L. R Ev . 307, 323 ( 1 98 8 ) .
1 64. See William H . Simon, Ethical Discretion i n Lawyering, 1 0 1 H A R V . L . REv. 1 08 3 , 1 084-86
( 1 98 8 ) . Professor Simon describes two broad tendencies in this debate about the content of lawyer
obligations as the "libertarian" and "regulatory" approaches.
1 65. STEPHEN G I LLERS & ROY D. SIMON. JR .. REGULATION UF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STAN
DARDS vii-viii ( 1 992). Gillers and Simon note that more than 35 jurisdictions have adopted the Model
Rules, but "there are notable variations among the jurisdictions, especially with respect to such crucial
matters as conflicts and confidentiality . . .These state variations graphically illustrate the disagree-
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other wo�ds, these points of reference often are themselves blurred and
sometimes moving targets.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical taken from the conflict
of interest section of a leadi ng professional responsibility casebook. 1 66 An
associate at a large firm has been working on a large and complicated civil
case for the past two years. His firm represents a defendant in the case
which is pending in a trial court in an area of the country known for sub
stantial anti-semitism a mong the local population from which the j ury will
be chosen . A lthough the associate has done excellent work on the case and
would be a logical member of the trial team, the firm is considering remov
ing him from the case because he is J ewish and thus likely to arouse the
prejudice of the j urors.
What is at risk in this hypothetical is the courtroom effectiveness of the
team of trial lawyers in the face of the jury's prejudice. While all would
agree that a firm owes a client a duty to have its lawyers perform compe
tently and effectively in their role as courtroom advocates, the precise lim
its of this obligation are unclear. Does the duty of competent courtroom
advocacy encompass an obligation to cater to the prej udices of particular
jurors or judges ? There is no clear answer to this question. The proper
boundaries of courtroom advocacy have been and continue to be much
debated. 1 67
The important point is that how this obligation of effective courtroom
advocacy is defi ned is critical for the conflict of interest analysis. I f it does
encompass an obligation to cater to a jury's prej udices, then it is certainly
put at risk by keeping the associate on the case. If it does not, then what is
at risk is beyond the scope of the conflict of interest rules. The point is that
we must look to the contours of the underlying obligations lawyers owe
their clients in terms of effective courtroom performance in order to have a
point of reference for j udging risk under the conflicts rules. The starting
point for answering this problem requires us to answer a question which is
outside the realm of conflict of interest. If such a question is not clearly
answered by the rules dealing with the underlying obligation, that ambigu
ity transfers onto the conflict of interest analysis.
This problem should not be overstated. Many, perhaps most, conflict of
interest scenarios put at risk aspects of lawyer obligations which are well
established and defined. But as long as there is ambiguity in defining un
derlying obligations and roles of lawyers, this ambiguity will continue to
ments over how lawyers should conduct themselves . . " !d.
1 66. Gll.LERS & DoRSEN, supra note 1 8, at 6 1 3.
1 6 7. The arguments for and against reassignment of the associate are set forth id. at 6 1 3- 1 4. A
"regulatory" approach to advocacy would probably argue that lawyers owe their clients no such duty,
while a "libertarian" a pproach might well argue in favor of such a duty. See Simon, supra note 1 64.
.
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plague conflict of interest a nalysis which touches on these gray areas.
B.

W HAT RISKS ARE ACCEPTA B L E ?

Perhaps the central question for a risk approach to conflict of interest is
defining which risks are acceptable and which are unacceptable. At what
point does the risk of impairment of an attorney's functioning become un
acceptable? In turn, this question leads to several subsidiary questions hav
ing to do with both the magnitude and the justifiability of the risk.
l . What Magnitude of Risk Is Acceptable?
Current doctrine sends a wide range of inconsistent messages about how
much risk should be tolerated. At times it expresses abhorrence of any risk.
At times it is accepting of substantial risk. At still other times, it displays
various intermediate degrees of risk aversion falling between these
extremes.
a. The Zero Risk Fallacy
One possible a nswer to the question of what magnitude of risk is accept
able is the simple answer that none is acceptable. I n other words, conflict
of interest doctrine might adopt an attitude of "zero risk tolerance," insist
ing that lawyers avoid situations which create any risk of i mpairment of a
professional role or obligation. Such an attitude of "zero risk tolerance"
has initial intuitive appeal, since risk of impairment certainly seems like
something we would want to discourage. Expression of such an attitude
would also make a useful rhetorical device for those seeking to defend the
image and reputation of the bar.
One finds expression of zero risk tolerance in conflict of i nterest doctrine
in varying guises. In an "exhortation" form, it appears as a caution to law
yers to avoid all risk. I n an "assertion" form, it appears as a claim that
certain recommended courses of conduct in fact achieve a state of zero
risk.
Upon examin ation, b'b th forms of the zero risk tolerance notion usually
are misleading rhetorical overstatements. The exhortation form holds out
the goal of what is usually an unrealizable norm and the assertion form
makes false claims about actually achieving that norm. Both forms are
based on the implicit assumption that an appropriate standard for judging
the real world of risk in which lawyers routinely operate is an ideal risk
free state. In adopting a point of view which implicitly presents the rele
vant choice as that between the ideal and the actual, the zero risk tolerance
notion succumbs to the nirvana fallacy often mentioned in the literature of

862

G E O R G ETOWN J O U RN A L O F LEGAL ETHICS

[Vol. 5 : 8 23

law and economics . 1 68 The nirvana fallacy consists of "comparing the im
perfect to the ideal and concluding that the ideal dominates. " 1 69 Ideal
states such as zero risk are typically either unattai nable or too costly to
attain and thus it is usually fallacious to compare the real with the ideal as
if the ideal were an available option.
A recent New York State Bar Opinion dealing with media rights pro
vides examples of both forms of this fallacy . 1 70 An assistant district attor
ney requested guidance concerning her sale of media rights allowing her
character to be portrayed i n telev i sion and movie presentations based on a
highly publicized murder case she had prosecuted. The threat which al
lowing such a sale presents to various facets of the prosecutor's effective
and ethical functioning has been examined in Part LA., supra. In sum, the
risk results from the combination of the prosecutor's financial "interest in
seeing the case sensationalized" and her control of the "means of sensa
tionalizing it" through her handling of the case . 1 7 1 The Opin ion demon
strates awareness of this obvious threat by citing language from the Model
Code's EC 5-4 warning that " [a] lawyer who gains an i nterest i n publica1 68 . Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoilll, 1 2 J.L. & EcoN. I , I ( 1 969).
The view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the relevant
choice as between an ideal norm and an existing "imperfect" institutional arrangement. This
nirvana approach differs considerably from a comparative instillltion approach in which the
relevant choice is between alternative real institutional arrangements. In practice, those who
adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real and
if discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Users of the comparative
institution approach attempt to assess which alternative real institutional arrangement seems
best able to cope with the economic problem; practitioners of this approach may use an ideal
norm to provide standards from which divergences are assessed for all practical alternatives
of interest and select as efficient that alternative which seems most likely to minimize the
divergence.
!d. For examples of use of the concept of nirvana fallacy in critiques of various areas of legal doctrine,
see the articles cited infra note 1 69.
1 69 . See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & David Partlett, A n A merica 's Cup for Tort Reform? A ustralia
and America Compared, 2 1 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 443, 452 ( 1 98 8 ) (stating that " [t]he real world of torts
with all its warts cannot be compared with the idealized reformed world."); Richard A. Epstein, Two
Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 7 3 GEO. L.J. 1 377, 1 377- 1 378 ( 1 985) ("The right intellectual
orientation is not to set the aspirations of the system too high. Trying to get the right result in all cases
is noble, but it is also unattainable. It is another manifestation of the Nirvana fallacy, by which the
defects in one proposed set of institutions are compared to an unrealizable ideal instead of to their
feasible alternatives.") (quoting Demsetz, supra note 1 68); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporare Govern
ance Movement, 3 5 V AND. L. REv. 1 259, 1 272 ( 1 982) (asserting that "it is a form of the nirvana
fallacy to conclude that the structure of corporations or corporation law should be changed because
existing insitutitonal arrangements are imperfect.") (quoting Demsetz, supra note 1 68 ) .
1 70. New York State Bar O p . 606- 1 / 1 1 /90 ( 2 1 -8 9 ) .
1 7 1 . HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 1 .8.50 1 , a t 27 1 ( " A lawyer holding media rights t o the story
of the very case in which he is involved has an interest in seeing the case sensationalized. The lawyer
also has the means of sensationalizing it, by his choice of tactics and by the recommendations he makes
to the client.") .
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tion rights relating t o t h e subject matter of employment may b e tempted to
compromise the interest of the client for the lawyer's own anticipated pecu
niary gai n . " 1 7 2
The O pinion concludes that sale of media rights by the prosecutor is
impermissible while the case is pending. Such a sale is permissible, how
ever, once the representation has terminated. This delayed sale rule is con
flict of i nterest doctrine's standard resolution of such media rights issues.
The Model Code and Model Rules have provisions w hich parallel the re
sult in the Opinion, 1 73 and are cited in th e Opinion as support for its adop
tion of the delayed sale rule. 1 74
A moment's reflection reveals that requiring the prosecutor to wait until
after the representation is terminated to sell the rights does not eliminate
the threat that her fi nancial i nterest in increasing the value of the media
rights will compromise fulfillment of her professional roles and obligations.
The requirement simply converts the incentive from one of present finan
cial gain to one of future fi nancial gain. Nonetheless, the Opinion states
that " [a] fter the representation, the potential conflict with which the rule is
concerned disappears," 1 75 suggesting that delaying the sale has eliminated
the risk. This sort of zero risk claim is not an isolated phenomenon . The
Model Code's EC 5-4 states that media deals should be delayed until after
"termination of all aspects of the matter" in order "to prevent . . . poten
tially differing interests." 1 76 Similarly, a leading treatise in legal ethics
claims that the delay rule removes the temptation to be found in lawyer
media deals . 1 77
This same N ew York Bar Opinion demonstrates the exhortation version
1 72. New York State Bar Op. 606- 1 / 1 1 /90 at 28 ( 2 1 -89).
1 7 3 . MODEL RULES Rule 1 .8(d); MODEL CODE D R 5- 1 04(B) cited with approval in New York
State Bar Op. 606- 1 / 1 1 / 90, at 27-28 (2 1 -89).
1 74. New York State Bar Op . 606- 1 / 1 1 /90 at 27-28 (2 1 -89).
1 7 5. !d. at 27.
1 7 6. MODEL CODE EC 5-4 reads:

I f, in the course of his representation of a client, a lawyer is permitted to receive from his
client a beneficial ownership in publication rights relating to the subject matter of the. em
ployment, he may be tempted io subordinate the interests of the client to his own anticipated
pecuniary gain. For example/a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from his client televi
sion, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other publication rights with rep
sect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that
will enhance the value of his publication rights to the prejudice of his client. To prevent these
potential/)' differing interests, such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the
termination of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the employment, even though his em
ployment has previosly ended.
(emphasis added)
1 7 7 . HAZARD & HoDES, supra note 2, § 1 .8 . 50 I , at 27 1 ("Both the Code and the Rules of Profes
sional Conduct remove the temptation by prohibiting the arrangement altogether, at least until the
representation is terminated.") (emphasis added).
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of the zero risk fal lacy. After i ndicating that the prosecutor may sell her
media rights after the representation is terminated, the Opinion adds some
cautionary notes. First, it warns against the lawyer being actual l y influ
enced in her handling of the case, a statement reflecting realization of the
continuing existence of the very risk which the portion of the Opinion cited
in the previous paragraph claimed would disappear. 1 78 The Opinion then
adds a second caution . "Counsel must avoid even the temptation to take a
course of action that might enhance the value of the Ia wyer's publication or
media rights at the risk of i mpeding the client's cause. " 1 79 Obviously,
though, the very course of conduct which the Opinion approves, sale of the
media rights after term ination of the representation, creates the very temp
tation which the lawyer is advised to avoid . 1 80
Avoidance of ail risk of impairment for lawyers is an unattainable goal.
A lawyer's fees, for example, no matter what form they take are a source
of i ncentives which threaten to impair a lawyer's functioning. These incen
tives cannot be eliminated without eliminating compensation for Ia wyers,
an unlikely prospect. S imilarly, a lawyer's political views and his represen
tation of other clients are sources of incentives which threaten impairment
and cannot practic.a ily be eliminated.
However, certain specific sources of risk could be eliminated by the
adoption of rules absolutely banning particular types of attorney conduct.
Model Rule 1 .8 (c), for example, provides an instance of this sort of ap
proach with its absolute ban on a lawyer's preparing a legal instrument
which gives the lawyer or certain relatives any substantial gift from the
client. 1 8 1 Usuaily, though, conflict of i nterest doctrine chooses not to elimi
nate the risk entirely. For example, it would be possible to eliminate the
threat posed by lawyers seiling media rights concerning their cases by ab
solutely banning any such sales. Such an absolute ban would be costly and
conflict of interest doctrine in fact does not adopt such an approach.
1 78 . N e w York State B a r O p . 606- l / l l /90 a t 28 ( 2 1 -89).
1 79 . !d. (emphasis added ) .
I SO. For other examples of expression of the exhortation form of the zero risk fallacy, see Estates
Theatres, I nc . v. Columbia Pictures I ndus., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 99 (S. D.N .Y. 1 972) ("A lawyer
should not be permitted to put himself in a position where, even unconsciously he will be tempted to
'soft pedal' his zeal in furthering the interests of one client in order to avoid an obvious clash with those
of another."); RAYMOND L. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 273 (2d ed. 1 970) ("If there is the slightest doubt as
to whether or not the acceptance of professional employment will involve a conflict of interest between
two clients or with a former client, or a conflict between the interests of any client and that of the
attorney, or may require the use of information obtained through service of another client, the employ
ment should be refused. " ) .
1 8 1 . MODEL R U L E l .S (c) states:
A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer
as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamen
tary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.
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Rather, the existing delayed sale rule seems t o represent an implicit judg
ment that delay reduces the risk such media deals present to an acceptable
level. Or perhaps it simply looks better and thus the delayed sale rule
might be explained as consistent with an appearance approach . In either
case, it is clear that the delayed sale rule does not eliminate all risk arising
from such deals and thus the actual rule contradicts both the exhortation
and the assertion forms of the zero risk fallacy.
Expression of the zero risk fallacy does conflict of interest doctrine a
disservice. Conflicts issues and their resolution would be more understanda
ble if we were candid about the fact that a certai n a mount of risk of im
pairment is tolerable, either because we have no practical alternative or
because we think that there are sufficient reasons justifying the risk. Fail
ure to candidly admit that we allow such risk and adopting instead the
verbal posture that lawyers must entirely avoid risk is harmful in two ways.
One, it lends the conflicts rules an air of pontification and obvious contra
diction between what they say and what they do. Second, failure to openly
address the risk questions fails to provide lawyers or the bodies enforcing
the conflicts rules with guidance about the real questions of acceptability of
risk which must be and in fact are resolved every day by lawyers, courts,
and disciplinary boards in the conflicts area .
b. Acceptance of Substantial Risk
In the previous section, we saw that conflict of i nterest doctrine, despite
its articulation at times of a preference for avoidance of all risk, through its
rules actually fi nds certai n risks acceptable, such as those posed by delayed
media rights sales. Someti mes it finds acceptable situations posing substan
tial risk of i mpairment of a lawyer's functioning. Evans v. Jeff D., 1 82 a rela
tively recent Supreme Court case widely cited and excerpted in profes
sional responsibility texts as an example of treatment of attorney-client
conflict of interest, 1 83 provides a prime example of such an attitude.
The issue in Evans was the propriety in civil rights cases of defense set
tlement offers conditioned on waiver of payment of the plaintiff's attorney's
fees by the defendant. ,� cceptance of such a conditional offer leaves the
1 8 2. 475 u .s . 7 1 7 ( 1 986).
1 83 . The Evans case is excerpted at length in GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 18, at 740-57; G EOF
FREY HAZARD & SUSAN KONIAK. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 536-56 ( 1 990); JOH'i f.
SLTTO:\ & JOHN S. DZI ENKOWSKI. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LAWYERS 408- 1 5 ( 1 989). The
Evans case is summarized in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA. PROBLEMS AND MATERI
ALS 0 :\ PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 48 1 -8 2 (5th ed. 1 99 1 ) and in MORTIMER SCHWARTZ & RICH
ARD WY!liCK, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 323 (2d ed. 1 988). The fact pattern of Evans has been used
as the basis for a problem in K AUFMAN, supra note 1 5 1 , at 463, and the conflict of interest dimensions
of Evam are discussed i n this work at 477.
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plaintiff's lawyer uncompensated for the time i nvested in the case, which
may be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars . 1 84 Obviously, such offers
create a significant fi nancial incentive for the plaintiff's lawyer to recom
mend against the settlement, even if the settlement is in his client's best
interest. Take, for example, the lawyers in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 1 85 a
civil rights case decided by the Supreme Court during the same term as
Evans. I n Rivera, the Court approved an award by the trial court to the
lawyers of $245 ,45 6 . 2 5 for nearly 2,000 hours of time the plaintiff's attor
neys expended on the case . 1 86 In such a case, a conditional settlement offer
of the sort approved in Evans would have faced the plaintiff's lawyers w ith
the prospect of losing over $245 ,000, representing time already i nvested, if
they advised their client to settle . The risk accordingly is great that the
lawyer will react, as the lawyers did initially i n the Evans case, 1 87 by ignor
ing his client's interest and rej ecting out of hand any settlement offer con
ditioned on such a waiver. In short, there is substantial risk of impairment
of the lawyer's obligation to provide advice untainted by his own financial
self-interest concerning what is i n his client's best interest. 1 88
A number of jurisdictions prior to Evans prohibited such settlement of
fers. 1 89 The Supreme Court i n Evans, however, i nterpreted the civil rights
statute in question as not prohibiting such settlement offers. The primary
rationale for the Court's ruling was the public policy of encouragin g the
settlement of civil rights cases by providing the defense with a significant
financial incentive to settle in order to avoid payment of the large attor1 84. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U .S. 561 ( 1 986) (approving award of $245,456.25 in
attorney's fees).
1 85. !d.
1 86. !d. at 565, 58 1 .
1 87. Evans, 475 U.S. at 722 (noting that intially the waiver of attorney's fees sought by the defend
ant "was unacceptable to the Idaho Legal Aid Society, which had instructed Johnson to reject any
settlement offer conditioned upon a waiver of fees, but Johnson ultimately determined that his ethical
obligation to his clients mandated acceptance of the proposal.").
1 88 . Matthew G . Bertani, Comment, A ttorney Fees: Simultaneous Negotiation and the Condition
ing of Settlement Offers on the Merits Upon Waiver of Statutory Attorney 's Fees: An Ethical and
Policy Analysis, 29 ARI Z L. REv. 5 1 7, 527 ( 1 987) (noting that courts have found "the potential con
.

flict of interest between plaintiffs and their counsel [created by simultaneous negotiations] to be so
acute that bifurcated negotiations [are] necessary where statutory attorney's fees [are] available.");
Peter H . Woodin, Note, Fee Waivers and Civil Rights Settlement Offers: State Eth ics Prohibitions
After Evans v. Jejj' D., 87 COLUM. L. REV 1 2 1 4, 1 2 1 6 ( 1 987) (arguing that " [a] defendant's demand
for a fee waiver during settlement negotiations can create a conflict of interest between the civil rights
plaintiff and attorney that can harm the plaintiff's interests."); Comment, The Supreme Court, 1 985
Term-Leading Cases, 1 00 HARV. L. REv. 264 ( 1 986) (asserting that the Court in Evans "failed to
consider the practical effect of its holding: that attorneys will be tempted as a matter of course to
violate their ethical obligations.").
1 89. See. e.g., District of Columbia Bar, Op. 1 47 ( 1 985); G rievance Commission on Board of Over
seers of the Bar of Maine, Advisory Op. No. 1 7 ( 1 98 3 ) .
.
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ney's fees which can accrue in such cases . 1 90 The case may be criticized on
a number of grounds . 1 9 1 Of primary i nterest for the purposes of this article,
however, is the attitude it displays about the appropriate response to incen
tives which create risk of attorney impairment.
One of the arguments advanced in Evans against the propriety of condi
tional settlement offers was one based on concern for attorney conflict of
interest. The Evans Court responded to the argument that the civil rights
statute in question should be interpreted so as not to put the plaintiff's
lawyer in a conflict of interest situation as follows:
Although respondents contend that Johnson, as counsel for the class,
was faced with an "ethical dilemma" when petitioners offered him relief
greater than that which he could reasonably have expected to obtain for
his clients at trial (if only he would stipulate to a waiver of the statutory
fee award), and although we recognize Johnson's conflicting interest be
tween pursuing relief for the class and a fee for the Idaho Legal Aid Soci
ety, we do not believe that the "dilemma" was an "ethical" one in the
sense that Johnson had to choose between conflicting duties under the pre
vailing norms of professional conduct. Plainly, Johnson had no ethical ob
ligation to seek a statutory fee award. His ethical duty was to serve his
clients loyally and competently. Since the proposal to settle the merits was
more favorable than the probable outcome of the trial, Johnson's decision
to recommend acceptance was consistent with the highest standards of our
profession. The District Court, therefore, correctly concluded that ap
proval of the settlement involved no breach of ethics in this case. 1 92
This passage expresses the attitude that situations which pose high risk
of attorney impairment if they arise from the attorney's financial interests
are si mply not an ethical concern. The Court seems to be saying that the
plaintiff's lawyer has a clear ethical obligation not to allow h i s advice to be
tainted by his own financial self interest and that we can count on lawyers
1 90. Emns, 475 U .S. a t 732-38. The Court emphasized that "a general proscription against negoti
ated waiver of attorney's fees in exchange for a settlement on the merits would itself impede vindication
of civil rights, at least in some cases, by reducing the attractiveness of settlement." !d. at 732.
1 9 1 . One criticism is that such waivers, by making civil rights cases less financially attractive to
potential plaintiff's lawyers, will rri� ke it more difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to obtain counsel. See,
e.g., Evans, 475 U.S. 754-59 ( Brennan, J., dissenting) (predicting that "allowing defendants in civil
rights cases to condition settlement of the merits on a waiver of statutory attorney's fees will diminish
lawyers' expectations of receiving fees and decrease the willingness of lawyers to accept civil rights
cases."); Margaret A. de Lisser, Comment, Giving Substance to the Bad Faith Exception of Evans v.
1�/I D.: A Reconciliations of Evans with the Civil Rights Allonzey's Fees A wards Act of 1 976, 1 36 U.
PA. L. REv. 553, 567 ( 1 9 8 7 ) (arguing that " Evans creates a structure favoring the individual client at
the expense of the attorney, and ultimately at the expense of future civil rights litigants, who, because
of the inadequate fee generating alternatives, depend on the Fees Act's uniform and consistent opera
tion to attract counsel to represent them.").
1 92 . Evans, 475 U .S. at 727-28 (footnotes omitted).
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t o follow their ethical obligation no matter how great an incentive threat
ens to impair that obligation.
A similar attitude seems apparent i n the Court's discussion of its deci
sion's impact on promoting settlement. Obviously, settlement requires the
agreement of both sides in litigation. But the Court examined only the in
centives which conditional settlement offers create for defendants. U nex
amined was the disincentive to settle created by such settlement offers for
plaintiffs' lawyers. This may simply have been a failure to think the prob
lem through. Or it may reflect the same implicit attitude expressed in the
previous paragraph, that we can simply trust lawyers to resist such finan
cial incentives no matter how substantial they may be.
The attitude toward how much risk of impairment a lawyer should be
permitted to encounter expressed by Evans v. Jeff D. is precisely the oppo
site of that found in the zero risk fallacy. The zero risk fallacy tells us that
lawyers should avoid situations which pose any risk. The attitude found in
Evans indicates that situations which pose even very high risk are accept
able because we can count on lawyers simply to resist the incentives giving
rise to the risk. Where one expresses dread of encounters between l awyers
and risk, the other expresses bravado at such encounters.
c. Other S ignals About Acceptable Risk Levels
Between the extremes i llustrated in the previous sections, one fi nds all
sorts of signals about how much risk is acceptable. Some authorities speak
in terms of prohibiting possible i mpairment. A treatise defines conflict of
i nterest as anything which "might interfere" with the lawyer's j udgment. 193
The Model Rules prohibit situations in which the representation "may be
materially limited . " 1 94 Variations on this "possibility" approach include
Model Code DR 5 - l 0 1 (A)'s i nclusion of a reasonableness requirement in
the phrase "reasonably may be affected. " 1 95 Another variation is the prohi
bition of the "mere possibility" of impairment . 1 96 Other authorities seem to
require a higher level of risk by using terms which suggest probable rather
than possible impairment. The Model Code DR's 5- 1 0 5 (A) and (B) pro
hibit situations in which the lawyer's judgment is "likely" to be affected . 1 97
Still other authorities seem to require something greater. The Restatement,
for example, defines conflict of interest as a "substantial risk" of impair1 93. PATTERSON, supra note 4, at § 4.0 1 , 4-2.
1 94. MODEL RULES Rule 1 .7 .
1 95. MODEL CODE D R 5- l O l (A).
1 96. In re Lantz, 442 N .E.2d 989, 990 ( Ind. 1 982) (ordering reprimand of a state prosecutor who
represented both the state in a criminal case and the named defendant in a separate civil action).
1 97. MoDEL CoDE DR 5- 1 05(A)-(B).
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men t . 1 n I n s u m , current doctrine gives a wide range of inconsistent
messages about what likelihood of attorney impairment is tolerable, rang
ing from none, to possible, to probable, to substantial .
2. What Role Should Justifiability of the Risk Play?
What role should j ustifications for taking risk play in defin i ng acceptable
risk levels? In many areas of the law utilizing risk a nalysis, the standard
for determining acceptable risk is determined by using a cost-benefit analy
sis which balances the magnitude of risk in terms of the gravity and
probability of harm against the utility of the conduct which creates the
risk. 1 99 The Model Penal Code provides an illustration of this sort of stan
dard. Recklessness under the Model Penal Code requires that the risk be
both "substantial " and "unj ustifiable."200 Thus, a doctor who performs an
operation which entails a very high degree of risk of death to a patient will
not be reckless under the Model Penal Code regardless of the degree of
risk if the operation is the only means of saving the patient's life.2°1 I n
other words, the social util ity o f using the only means to save the patient's
life j ustifies what would otherwise be an unacceptably high l evel of risk.
How does this idea of the justifiability of risk figure into attorney con flict
of interest analysis? Notions of justifiability pervade cases, opinions and
comm entary about attorney conflict of i nterest. The Model Code's EC 5-7
in discussing the propriety of contingent fees states that although a contin
gent fee arrangement gives a lawyer a financial interest i n the outcome of
the litigation, the arrangement is permissible because "it may be the only
means by which a layman can obtain the services of a lawyer of his
choice. " 202 I n other words, the Mode! Code expresses the idea that the de1 98. RESTATEMENT § 20 I .
1 99 . See, e.g., W . PAGE KEETON ET A L., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 1 , a t 1 7 1
(5th ed. 1 984) (enunciating the balancing of probability and gravity of any risk against the "utility of
the type of conduct in question."); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.4, at 6 1 9 (2d ed.
1 986) (stating that not only mus.t the risk be substantial, but that "it must also under the circum
stances be unjustifiable for [the individual] to take the risk," the "social utility" of the conduct must be
examined as well).
200. MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 2.[;12{2){c) { 1 962) ("A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the mate
rial element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor's situation.").
20 1 . MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02 cmt. ("The risk of which the actor is aware must of course be
substantial in order for the recklessness judgment to be made. The risk must also be unjustifiable. Even
substantial risks, it is clear, may be created without recklessness when the actor is seeking to serve a
proper purpose, as when a surgeon performs an operation that he knows is very l ikely to be fatal, but
reasonably thinks to be necessary because the patient has no other, safer chance.").
202. MODEL CODE EC 5-7.
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gree o f risk presented b y contingent fees i s acceptable once t h e justifiability
factors of access to counsel and choice of counsel are entered into the equa
tion . In the area of conflicts dealing with simultaneous representation of
two clients, the justi fications of saving each client time and money a ppear
repeatedly in cases, opinions and commentary. In the area of joint repre
sentation in a litigated case, the justification of maintaining a unified front
features prominently. J ustice Frankfurter's words are frequently quoted to
express this justification for allowing joint representation: "a common de
fense . . . gives strength against a common attack."203
The conflicts problem considered above i n Part I I I .A.2. concerni n g re
assignment of an associate on a case because the religious backgrou n d of
the associate is likely to arouse the prejudice of the j ury presents a conflict
of interest situation in which the idea of justifiability of risk may prove
crit ical . Previously, we asked whether or not catering to the prejudice of
the jury to increase the client's chance of winning is within the sphere of
obl igations owed by the law firm to the client and if so whether it w as one
which was protected by the conflict of i nterest rules. If one assumes for
purposes of argument an affirmative answer to both of those questions, and
we assume that the j ury pool is such that there is a substantial risk of
prejudice against the associate, then the key question becomes one of
justifiability.
The associate to be removed from the case might argue a number of
factors as potential justifications for taking this risk. First, the associate
might argue her own career i nterest in the experience to be provided by
handling the case. The experience may provide her with i ncreased m arket
ability and mobility as well as increase her value to the firm and thus in
crease her chances for making partner. She may also assert a n interest in
being treated on an ethnically neutral basis in terms of being assigned
work. The conflicts question then turns on whether attorney conflict of in
terest rules include within the concept of justifiability either the associate's
economic and career interests or the i nterest in being treated on an ethni
cally neutral basis. I f so, then how much weight do we give them in offset
ting the risk of impairment of the attorney's courtroom effectiveness in act
ing for the client?
The issue of justifi ability breaks down i nto subsidiary questions. Should
justifiability play a role at all? If so, how do we define what factors should
be incorporated in the idea of justifiability? Should we l imit it to factors
which provide benefit to the client, such as saving time or money or pre
serving a unified front? S hould it also i nclude factors which provide benefit
to attorneys, such as the attorney being treated in an ethnically or racially
203. Glasser

v.

U n i ted States, 3 1 5 U .S. 60, 92 ( 1 942) ( Frankfurter, J . , dissenting).
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non-discriminatory way ? Should i t include factors which benefit society or
the admin istration of j ustice generally, like promoting settlement of cases
and easing crowded dockets? Once we decide these questions, then we must
confront the final question of how much weight to give these factors in
offsetting magnitude of risk.
There is virtually no guidance on any of these questions in the Model
Code or Model Rules. N either of these even mentions the idea of j ustifia
bility in their rule formul ations, m uch less do they provide any guidance on
any of the other questions mentioned above. Cases frequently utilize j ustifi
ability factors, but almost no explicit discussion is given to the notion of
justifiability, how it is defined, or how much weight it is to be given in the
final determination of the acceptability of the risk presented.
C.

WHO DECIDES?

Part I I I so far has advanced a series of risk analysis questions having to
do with defining acceptable levels of risk of impairment o f an attorney's
functioning. The next question we need to turn to is who gets to choose the
answers to the previous questions. Who sets the level of acceptable risk?
The client? The i ndividual lawyer? The organized bar? The j udge if the
conflict of interest question arises i n a litigated case?
The issue of the proper balance of authority and responsibility between
lawyer and client has received considerable attention a mong academic
com mentators.204 One of the poin ts which present doctrine is clear about is
that it does grant the client a degree of decisionmaking authority and re
sponsibility regarding conflict of interest. One of the prominent features of
modern conflicts doctrine is the disclosure and consent formula.205 Under
this formula, the lawyer is obligated to disclose to the client the existence
of certai n incentives which threaten i m pairment and after such disclosure
the lawyer may proceed with the representation if the client consents. The
existence of this disclosure and consent formula m ight be described as re
flecting a " market model " of professional regulation in which the individ
ual client as a consumer of legal services exercises her own preference for
,�

204. See, e.g., GILLERS & DORSEN, supra note 1 8, at 4 1 5-430; WOLFRAM, supra note I I , at 1 541 59; D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHo's IN CHARGE? ( 1 974); Marcy Strauss , Toward a Re
vised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for A utonomy, 65 N .C.L. REv. 3 1 5
( 1 987); David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1 98 1 Wis. L. REV. 454; Mark Spiegel,
Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consell/ and the Legal Profession, 1 28 U. PA. L. REv.
41 ( 1 979); Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consell/ in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 307
( 1 980); Judith L. Maute, A llocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the Model Rules of Profes
sional Conduct, 1 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REv., 1 049 ( 1 984).
205. See, e.g., MODEL CODE DR 5- I O l (A), DR 5- l 05(C); MoDEL RULES Rule l .7(a)(2), (b)(2);
WoLFRAM, supra note I I , at 3 3 7-349.
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risk.206 I n short, this formula gives the client some choice about the ques
tions of both magnitude and justifiability of the risk she is willing to have
her lawyer encounter.
The range of choice which a client may exercise under the disclosure and
consent formula is, however, limited . At a certain point under current doc
trine, one reaches a zone of "nonconsenta ble" conflicts.2°7 In this zone, the
rules override client choice about risk preference. The Model Code uses an
"obviously adequate" test to define the zon e of nonconsentable conflicts.208
The Model Rules use a "reasonable belief' test to define this zone.209
Although the basic notions that the client has a role i n making choices
about conflict questions and that the range of client choice about these
questions is circumscribed by the notion of nonconsentable conflicts are
well established, the line between "consentable" and " nonconsentable" con
flicts is murky. Neither the "obvious adequacy" nor the "reasonable belief'
tests provide much guidance o n where to draw the boundary of client au
tonomy in the area of con flict of interest.210
Another area which is unclear is precisely what is required by disclosure
and consent. One might well have doubts, for example, about both the
quality and quantity of information available to the client in making her
choice about risk. These doubts seem particularly well founded in the con
flicts area where the lawyer is the one who supplies the information to the
client. The lawyer has an economic incentive not to fully disclose all the
information which might dissuade the client from consenting to the conflict
so that he can keep the client's business in order to increase his own in
come. Conflicts doctrine provides little guidance on the question of how
much i n formation must be disclosed.
One might argue that a m arket or consumer sovereignty model over
states the ability of the client to use the information available to her. This
argument focuses on the client's lack of expertise rather than lack of raw
information . Particularly when the choice involves an area such as profes
sional . services like law or medicine, this argument would assert that the
consumer simply lacks the expertise to understand and choose between the
risks associated with various courses of action . The very existence of the
disclosure and consent formula represents at least a partial rejection of this
206. See John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CoRNELL L. REV. 1 02 1 ( 1 982)
(describing a market model of professional reform which looks to private contract and market mecha
nisms rather than outside regulation to prevent lawyer abuses).
207 . See WOLFRAM, supra note I I , at 337-343.
208. See MoDE L CODE DR 5-l OS( C), WoLFRAM, supra note 1 1 , at 3 3 9-343.
209. See MODEL RULES Rule l .7(a)( l ), (b) ( l ); WOLFRAM, supra note I I , at 339-343.
2 1 0. For discussion of the ambiguities and inadequacies of the Model Code 's "obviously adequate"
and the Model Rules' "reasonable belief' provisions, see WoLFRAM, supra note I I , at 3 4 1 ; Moore,
supra note 5 , at 220-230.
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argument. But t h e argument about lack o f expertise raises a number o f
problems. For example, m a y or must the lawyer in making disclosure also
give the cl ient advice on the wisdom of consenting? When is the advice of
an independent lawyer on the question of consenting to a conflict required,
if ever? Present doctrine leaves these questions largely unaddressed.21 1
A nother argument which might be raised against a market or consumer
sovereignty model is that even if the client has adequate i n formation and
expertise to make a decision about risk of attorney impairment, the quality
of that choice is frequently impaired because of lack of alternatives. For
example, when an individual employee of a company consents to joint rep
resentation of the i ndividual employee and the company by lawyers paid
for by the company, is this choice a truly voluntary one when she lacks the
resources to pay for her own lawyer?
Other factors may also u ndermine the quality of voluntariness underly
ing the consent. If the conflict comes up not at the outset of the representa
tion, but during the representation, the fact that the client has already in
vested time and money i n the lawyer's services may undermine the client's
freedom of choice. Post-retainer fee agreements between lawyers and cli
ents raise a similar problem and courts review such fee agreements under a
different and more demanding standard than that applied to fee agree
ments negotiated at the outset of the relationship.212 Whether there should
be a similar distinction between client consent regarding conflict of interest
obtained at the outset of the representation as opposed to during the repre
sentation is an i nteresting and unresolved question.
A nother interesting and important question unanswered by current doc
trine is whether the same boundary for nonconsentable conflicts should be
set for all clients. One could argue, for example, for more relaxed or even
no limits on the range of choice regarding risk preference for clients who
have considerable ability to assess and monitor risk, such as a corporate
client with in house counsel . We might recognize a "sophisticated client"
exception to the normal rules about nonconsentable confl icts.21 3 Similarly,
one could also argue for more stringent limits on the range of choice re
garding risk preference for clients whose abi l ities to monitor and assess risk
·"'

2 1 1 . The Model R ules Rule 1 .8(a){2) does provide some guidance on the question of independent
advice by requiring that the client be given "a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel" before entering into a business transaction with his lawyer.
2 1 2. See G I LLERS & DORSEN, supra note 1 8, at 1 1 2 ("When the fee agreement is reached after the
attorney-client relationship is formed, courts are especially strict in reviewing it for fairness . . . After
retainer, the client is presumed to be less free to go elsewhere a nd the attorney is assumed to be in a
significantly superior bargaining position.").
2 1 3. An analogous "sophisticated investor" notion is mentioned i n the field of securities law. See,
e.g., Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcemelll of Arbitration Agreements, 7 1
M I :\�. L REV 3 9 3 , 427-3 1 ( 1 987).
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are questionable, such a s criminal defendants.214
So far we have referred to two possible answers to the question about
who sets the level of acceptable risk in situations which threaten attorney
impairment, the client or the organized bar through its rules about noncon
sentable conflicts. Another source of ambiguity in conflicts doctrine is its
suggestion of other possible answers to this question of who decides about
such risks. For example, in Holloway v. Arkansas,2 1 5 the U nited States
Supreme Court stated that an "attorney representing two defendants in a
criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to deter
mine when a conflict of i nterest exists or will probably develop i n the
course of a trial. " 2 1 6 Similarly, the Advisory Committee notes t o Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 state that " [a]voiding a conflict-of-interest
situation is in the fi rst instance a responsibility of the attorney."217 These
passages may simply suggest that the i ndividual lawyer has the responsibil
ity to monitor and enforce the bar's rules about disclosures and consent and
nonconsentable conflicts. But these passages also seem to suggest some
measure of authority, perhaps even discretion, on the part of the attorney
about determining the line between consentable and nonconsentable con
flicts because of the attorney's unique vantage point and familiarity with
the facts of the particular case.
A different message about who gets to decide the essential risk prefer
ence questions is sent by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44 and recent
Supreme Court authority concerning joint representation in criminal cases.
Both Rule 44(c) and Wheat v. United States21 8 grant the trial j udge con
siderable authority to override a criminal defendant's choice about joint
representation. The boundary l i ne, though, between the trial judge's sphere
of authority and the defendant's sphere of autonomy concerning the joint
representation is blurred. Rule 44(c) , for example, simply provides that the
"the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each
defendant's right to counsel ."219 The Wheat case applies a discretionary
standard of review to the trial judge's decision whether to override a crimi
nal defendant's choice about joint representation220 but provides virtually
2 1 4. See Moore, supra note 5 (arguing for an absolute ban on post-indictment joint representation of
criminal defendants because of problems relating to capacity to consent) .
2 1 5. 435 U.S. 475 ( 1 978).
2 1 6. !d. at 485 (quoting State v. Davis, 5 1 4 P.2d 1 025, 1 027 (Ariz. 1 973)).
2 1 7 . FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules re: 1 979 Amendment.
2 1 8. 486 U.S. 1 53 ( 1 988).
2 1 9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c).
220. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 1 63 ("we think the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in
refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be
demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which
may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses").
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n o guidance o n how this discretion i s t o b e exercised.
In short, there are many unanswered questions under current doctrine
relating to the main question of allocation of decisionmaking authority with
respect to setting acceptable risk levels .
I V.

REMAINING DI FFI C U LTI ES

The suggestions set forth in this article are intended as first steps toward
improvi ng the clarity and sophistication of attorney conflict of interest doc
trine. Developing a clear vocabulary, distinguishing risk of impairment, re
sulting i mpairment, and appearance of impairm ent, and breaking down
risk analysis into components such as magnitude and justifiability will all
help in understanding the basic issues. Once this foundation is in place,
many difficulties remain .
A.

A C H I E V I N G CONSENSUS

The thrust of this article is that we lack clear concepts and terminology
language for dealing with attorney conflict of i nterest. One explanation for
the present ambiguities of conflict of interest doctrine is that the problem is
simply one of language. Once lawyers gain adequate conceptual and termi
nological means for discussing and formulating doctrine, they will be able
to achieve consensus on how to answer questions about the role of risk,
about defining acceptable risk levels, and about who gets to decide these
questions . One might call this the "Babel" thesis, conjuring up the image
o f a legal profession which is plagued by a simple inability to
communicate.
Another possible explanation is that the present conceptual and termino
logical confusion, rather than being simply a problem of language, is the
product of a more fundamental lack of professional consensus about the
standards which should govern the questions addressed in Parts II and III.
One may view the doctrinal confusion as reflecting the fact that lawyers
have widely differing feelings on questions such as the magnitude of ac
ceptable risk, the j ustifiability factors which should be included in setting
acceptable risk levels;-1' and who should get to make the decisions about
these questions.221 "The profession's i nability to reach consensus on the pro22 1 . See Moore, supra note 5, at 225 ("The profession's inability to reach consensus on the propriety
of even the most common instances of multiple representation also suggests serious disagreement re
garding the significance of the policy considerations thought to underlie the current A BA Code conflict
of interest rule.") ( footonotes ommitted); Professor Hazard suggests a similar possible explanation for
the difficulties which have plagued efforts to arrive at ethical standards for lawyers in negotiation.

The fundamental difficulty appears to stem from the lack of a firm professional consensus
regarding the standard of openness that should govern lawyers' dealings with others and the
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priety of even the most common instances of multiple representation "222 is
an index of a lack of consensus on the proper resolution of conflict o f i nter
est questions. The variation from state to state in ethics codes is an i ndex of
a lack of consensus regarding ethical standards for lawyers generally.223
Such disagreements may be exacerbated with the i ncreasing demographic
diversity of the legal profession.224 Lack of consensus a mong lawyers may
be indicative of lack of consensus among society as a w hole.225 Such a lack
of concensus would cause obvious difficulties in formulating the answers to
the questions set forth in this article.
B.

V A G U E NESS IN THE D E F I N I TI O N O F ATTORNEY R O L E S AND O B LI G ATIONS

Part l l l . A . , supra, addressed the issue of providing a clear focal point for
analyzing risk to an attorney's various roles and obligations. One of the
problems described i n that Part is that conflict of i nterest doctrine does not
clearly describe which roles and obligations are the concern of conflict of
i nterest doctrine. A second problem is that it is difficult to measure the
possibility of i mpairment unless we have a fairly clear idea of the defini
tions of those roles and obligations, yet many of the roles and obligations
lack of settled and homogeneous standards of technique i n the practice of law. This lack of
consensus indicates that lawyers, at least nationally, do not share a common conception of
fairness i n the process of negotiation. The lack of this consensus means that lawyers lack the
language to express norms of fairness i n negotiation and the institutional means to give effect
to these norms.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing With Opposing
Parties, 33 S.C. L. REv. 1 8 1 , 1 90- 1 93 ( 1 98 1 ) (discussing the rejection of the Kutak Commission's 1.980
proposal of an ethical rule of fairness in negotiations which encompassed a duty to disclose material
facts).
222. Moore, supra note 5 , at 225.
223. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 1 65 , at vii-viii ("More than 35 jurisdictions have now adopted
the Model Rules or significant provisions from them in some form, and there are notable variations
among the jurisdictions, especially with respect to such crucial matters as conflicts and confidential
ity . . .These state variations graphically illustrate the disagreements over how lawyers should conduct
themselves.").
224. For discussion of demographic developments in the legal profession, see Richard L. Abel, The
Transformation of the A merican Legal Profession, 20 LAW & SoCIETY REv. 7 ( 1 986) (describing
divisions of race, gender, age, class and types of practice which make professional consensus increas
ingly problematic); Barbara A. Curran, American Lawyers in the 1 980's: A Profession in Transition,
20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 1 9 ( I 986); Terence C. Halliday, Six Score Years and Ten: Demographic Tran
sition in American Legal Profesion, / 850-1 980, 20 LAW & Soc'v REv. 53 ( 1 986).
225. See supra note 22 1 . Professor Hazard follows his comments quoted in footnote 22 1 , supra, with
the observation that the disagreement among lawyers about standards of fairness in negotiation is not
difficult to understand when viewed against a larger social backdrop. "Lawyers standards of fairness
are necessarily derived from those of society as a whole, and subcultural variations are enormous . . .
Against this kaleidoscopic background, it is difficult to specify a single standard that governs the parties
and thus a correlative standard that should govern their legal representatives." Hazard, supra note 22 1 ,
at 1 93.
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which provide the focal point for conflicts analysis are themselves poorly
defined .
This problem cannot b e cured b y reformulating conflict of interest doc
trine. Clearer formulation of the rules defining the lawyer's roles and obli
gations apart from the conflict of interest rules is needed to mend this
problem . In short, because conflict of i nterest doctrine must incorporate by
reference other rules which define attorney roles and obligations, the con
flict rules are affected by whatever ambiguity those rules contain . Conse
quently, conflict of interest doctrine will continue to struggle with these
vague definitions even if it does clearly state its own concerns.
C.

ACHI E V I N G C L E A R EXPRESSI ON

Part I Y . A . , supra, mentioned the possible problems which might be en
countered in achieving consensus on the answers to the questions posed i n
Parts I I and I I I , such as setting the parameters of acceptable risk and cli
ent decision making authority in the conflicts area . Even if consensus can
be achieved, it will nonetheless be difficult clearly to express the answers to
many of these questions. For example, it will be difficult verbally to express
the line between acceptable and unacceptable levels of risk of i mpairment,
the parameters of justifiability and the proper sphere of client autonomy i n
deciding about acceptable risk.
V.

C O NC LUSIO N

Threats of impairment of an attorney's functioning m a y arise from an
almost limitless number of sources. Such threats are an inevitable and ever
present part of the work lives of lawyers. The hard questions which lie at
the heart of the subj ect of attorney conflict of interest concern how to re
spond to these threats, how to distinguish risks which are acceptable from
those which are unacceptable. I f attorney conflict of interest doctrine is to
provide guidance to lawyers in encountering such risk situations and to
courts and disciplinary committees applying conflict of interest standards to
lawyers, it must articulate and a nswer these essential questions. This arti
cle has sought to demo9strate the need for rethinking attorney conflict of
interest doctrine so that it focuses unambiguously on these central ques
tions. It has a lso sought to provide the fi rst steps toward a clearer, more
sophisticated treatment of attorney conflict of interest doctrine.

